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CLAIMING DESIGN
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Design stands out among intellectual property subject matter in terms of the extent
of overlapping protection available. Different forms of intellectual property usually
protect different aspects of a product. In the design context, however, precisely the
same features are often subject to design patent, trademark, and copyright
protection—and parties commonly claim more than one of those forms. Yet, as we
show, the claiming regimes of these three forms of design protection differ in significant
ways: the timing of claims; claim format (particularly whether the claims are visual
or verbal); the multiplicity of claims (whether and how one can make multiple claims
to the same design); and the level of abstraction at which parties claim rights. These
methodological differences have significant effects on the operation of each individual
regime. All of the claiming regimes have significant shortcomings, particularly in
terms of the quality of notice the claims provide to third parties about their scope.
That notice problem is worsened, as we argue, by the frequent cumulation of rights
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in the same design. Claim ambiguity and parties’ ability to switch back and forth
between different design claims—both within and across legal regimes—make it
difficult for courts and third parties to evaluate the validity and scope of rights. There
is significant irony here because intellectual property claims exist almost entirely to
provide notice. Cumulation also enables design rightsholders to assert rights in one or
more regimes using the claiming rules that benefit them most at a particular moment,
without any risk that those claiming choices will bind them in later rights assertions.
We suggest a number of improvements to each claiming regime that would help
restore internal order. We also analyze various approaches to ameliorating the amplified
costs of overlapping regimes for claiming design. In particular, we focus on doctrines of
election and channeling rules as alternative methods of directing designs to one regime
or another. We also introduce the possibility of transsubstantive intellectual property
claiming rules as a way to reduce important inconsistencies across these regimes while
also allowing protection under multiple regimes. Each of these solutions would alleviate
at least some of the concerns we identify, though one’s preference among them will likely
depend on one’s level of concern about overlapping rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Beautiful and thoughtful design is striking. Design is also ascendant.
From the iPhone to Christian Louboutin shoes to Eames furniture, design
occupies an increasingly influential role in our culture and economy.1 The
intellectual property laws that protect design are also striking, but for a
different reason: the extent of overlapping protection they permit.
To be sure, design is not the only subject matter that implicates multiple
forms of intellectual property protection, which are each thought to promote
creation, innovation, or fair competition in their respective realms. In other
cases of overlapping protection for a product or service, however, each form
covers a different aspect of the subject matter. Software, for example, is
potentially subject to both utility patent and copyright protection.2 But utility
patent protects only the functional aspects of software, whereas copyright law
protects only its nonfunctional, expressive aspects.3

1 See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445,
447-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing the financial success and cultural significance of
Louboutin’s acclaimed red-soled shoes), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir.
2012); Tim Bradshaw, Designers on the Ascendant in Silicon Valley, FIN. TIMES (July 7, 2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/b587e678-e42c-11e2-91a3-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/PV4569EG] (explaining that designers now play crucial roles in startup companies as a result of
Apple’s influence); Sophie Gilbert, The Vision of Charles and Ray Eames, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/11/charles-and-ray-eamesbeyond-the-chair/415764/ [https://perma.cc/CV2U-5DYF] (describing the immense success of
Eames furniture and its lasting influence on modern designers at companies including Apple
and Ikea); see also, e.g., ALICE RAWSTHORN, HELLO WORLD: WHERE DESIGN MEETS LIFE
iv (2014) (noting that design is a tool that brings about “scientific, technological, cultural,
political, economic, social, environmental or behavioral” changes).
2 For a thorough exploration of the roles of utility patent and copyright in the software context,
see Pamela Samuelson, Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the Shadow of Patents, 71 FLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3250496. See also
Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L. REV. 1293, 1320-24 (2017)
[hereinafter Buccafusco & Lemley, Functionality] (discussing copyright’s filtering analysis for computer
software); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1505 (2010)
(“Given that writing computer source code is more about problem solving than problem finding, it is
an uneasy fit in copyright law, in which the protectability standard is tailor-made for expression valued
for its problem finding.”); Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35
CONN. L. REV. 439, 439-40 (2003) (underscoring that “the already much eroded distinction between
patent and copyright subject matter would almost completely disappear for digital technologies” if
patent were to be “limited to physical artifacts”).
3 See, e.g., Buccafusco & Lemley, Functionality, supra note 2, at 1320 (“The code’s functional
components, however, are not protectable [by copyright], so courts must screen them out and
focus only on the remaining expression.”). In this context, like others involving subject matter
overlap, courts have developed substantial doctrine for the purpose of channeling protection of
distinct aspects of the subject matter to a particular regime. See id. at 1320-21 (citing cases in
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Design is different. Unlike the complementary use of different forms of
intellectual property for different aspects of other sorts of subject matter,
parties commonly claim multiple forms of protection for precisely the same
features of a design. For example, Puma recently sued fast-fashion retailer
Forever 21, asserting design patent, trademark, and copyright infringement;
Puma alleged that Forever 21 copied the same features of three footwear
designs that it had developed in collaboration with singer Rihanna, one of
which is shown in Figure 1.4
Figure 1: Bow Slides from Puma and Forever 215

Each relevant legal regime—design patent, trademark, and copyright—makes
some effort to channel protection of design’s functional features to utility patent
law. But intellectual property law is largely comfortable with overlapping
protection for design’s nonfunctional aspects. The various forms of design
protection can have complementary or cumulative economic effect, as each legal
regime might imbue the claimant with somewhat different substantive rights and

which the “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test was applied). Considerable debate has arisen
around the effectiveness of those doctrines.
4 Amended Complaint at 3-12, Puma SE v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 17-2523 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4,
2017) [hereinafter Puma Amended Complaint]; see also Complaint at 11-17, Skinny Brand Jeans
LLC v. QVC, Inc., No. 18-2011 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2018) (asserting trade dress, unfair competition,
and copyright infringement claims against QVC, which allegedly copied Skinny Brand Jeans’s
“unique, innovative, distinctive and recognizable slimming wash pattern” and “stomach
restraining panel” for women’s jeans).
5 Puma Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 9.
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make different remedies available. As a result, strategic parties are often able to
use design patent, trademark, and copyright laws cumulatively or as substitutes.
One of us has elaborated elsewhere on the problem of cumulation of
intellectual property rights.6 But even those not disposed to regard
cumulation as problematic in principle7 ought to be concerned about the
considerable differences in claiming methodologies across design patent,
trademark, and copyright. At the very least, those differences undermine
notice and create worrisome opportunities for strategic behavior.
Take, for example, the plaintiff ’s claim in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc.8 In that landmark trademark case, Taco Cabana, a fast-food Mexican
restaurant chain, claimed as its trade dress the exterior and interior design of
its restaurants,9 which it characterized as consisting of
a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated
with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior
and exterior areas with the interior patio capable of being sealed off from the
outside patio by overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of the building
is a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes.
Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.10

6 See Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 824 (2011) [hereinafter
McKenna, (Dys)Functionality] (discussing the cumulation of rights in trademark law resulting from
“courts differ[ing] over the extent to which the [functionality] doctrine focuses on competitors’ right
to copy unpatented features as opposed to their need to copy”); Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J.
Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (2013) [hereinafter
McKenna & Strandburg, Progress] (worrying about a design patent regime that overlaps with utility
patent, trade dress, and copyright laws).
7 Compare 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07
(2016) (arguing that there is no reason that the same design cannot be protected by both copyright
and patent laws) with Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property Rights: Subject
Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 36, 73-89 (2011) [hereinafter Beckerman-Rodau, Problem]
(concluding that overlapping protection “undermines the careful balance individually developed
under each body of intellectual property law”); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents:
The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1476 (2004)
[hereinafter Moffat, Mutant Copyrights] (“[T]he availability of overlapping intellectual property
protection in all of its forms presents a serious threat to the goals and purposes of federal intellectual
property policy . . . .”); Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and
Patent Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1512-16 (2017) [hereinafter Samuelson, Strategies]
(criticizing the overlap of copyright and utility patent protections for undermining intellectual
property law’s careful balance of encouraging creation while avoiding monopolies that stifle progress
and creativity). For an article acknowledging troublesome aspects of overlapping intellectual property
protections but arguing that “eliminating such overlaps as a structural matter would be inadvisable,”
see Laura A. Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election of Rights Versus Selection of
Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239, 275 (2013) [hereinafter Heymann, Overlapping].
8 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
9 Id. at 766.
10 Id. at 765 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The generality of that description is remarkable, particularly in light of
the photographs Taco Cabana entered into the record. As shown on the left
in Figure 2, the most visually striking aspect of Taco Cabana’s restaurant
design is its primarily pink color. Had Taco Cabana been forced to articulate
the elements of its trade dress prior to and independently of its dispute with
Two Pesos, it seems likely that the color pink would have featured
prominently in that description. But because Taco Cabana could enforce its
rights without having to register the trade dress,11 it was never forced to
delineate its claim before the dispute. Once it confronted Two Pesos’ blue
design, Taco Cabana surely was not going to emphasize the pink color
scheme. Instead, it strategically claimed its trade dress to capture Two Pesos’
specific design choices, highlighting a more general “festive eating
atmosphere” and “festive and vivid color scheme.”12
Figure 2: Photographs of Taco Cabana (Left) and Two Pesos (Right)
Restaurants13

There are good reasons to allow parties to assert rights in unregistered
trademarks.14 Registration favors large, sophisticated companies, which
generally are familiar with the registration system and have the resources to
seek registration for each new potential trademark.15 The availability of
11 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209-10 (2000); Two Pesos,
505 U.S. at 768.
12 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765-66.
13 Two Pesos v. Cabana, CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://courses2.cit.cornell.edu/sociallaw/
student_projects/Tradedresspage2.html#_edn20 (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
14 That said, courts’ extension of federal law to allow claims based on unregistered rights
altered the traditional relationship between trademark and unfair competition laws in ways that were
not fully considered. See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 288, 289 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (“[T]he
persistent sense that federal and state law regulate concurrently has masked a significant
federalization of trademark and unfair competition law over the last forty to fifty years.”).
15 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1313, 1350 (2012) (“The relative advantage in litigation costs enjoyed by large corporations
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unregistered rights makes it easier for smaller, less sophisticated companies
to claim rights without significant expense. Unregistered rights are also
substantially more flexible. A party that goes to the expense of registering a
mark has some incentive to stick with that mark over longer periods of time,
whereas unregistered rights are better suited to marks that might be adapted
or used in connection with different goods or services over time.
Recognition of unregistered rights is also consistent with foundational
American trademark principles because trademark rights have always arisen
out of use rather than registration.16
Still, the flexibility of unregistered rights can have real costs. One obvious
cost is a lack of notice regarding the scope of rights claimed by a party. Before
litigation, Two Pesos could only have observed Taco Cabana’s use in the
marketplace and made an educated guess as to the features of any trade dress
owned by Taco Cabana. Based on its observation, Two Pesos might reasonably
have believed that, if Taco Cabana had any rights to the design of its
restaurants, the color pink was an essential—and central—part of the trade
dress. Indeed, Two Pesos might have chosen to use blue in its restaurant
design precisely to avoid infringement.
Relatedly, the flexibility of unregistered rights enables strategic behavior on
the part of claimants. Because it was able to defer claiming until it asserted its
rights against Two Pesos, Taco Cabana was able to define its trade dress to
encompass Two Pesos’ design. It might not have been able to do so if it had been
forced to claim earlier and independently of the particular dispute. In addition,
trademark law has no rules fixing the level of generality at which trade dress
must be described.17 Taco Cabana was thus able to claim without referencing
specific features that might have contrasted with corresponding features of the
Two Pesos design or invited comparisons to the designs of the many other
Mexican restaurants whose restaurants predated Taco Cabana’s. As a result, Taco
Cabana was able to leave the scope of its rights open in other cases.
To compare design patent claiming, consider luxury Italian footwear
company Aquazzura’s recently settled case against Ivanka Trump.18 Aquazzura
enables them continuously to expand the scope of trademark protection at the expense of small
businesses that can ill-afford to protect their rights in lengthy court battles.”); cf. Jessica M.
Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in Trademark Enforcement
Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 221-23 (2014) (commenting on the “numerous direct and
indirect costs” of trademark enforcement and protection).
16 See, e.g., Am. Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 287 (6th Cir. 1900) (“It is the
party who uses it first as a brand for his goods, and builds up a business under it, who is entitled to
protection, and not the one who first thought of using it on similar goods, but did not use it.”
(quoting George v. Smith, 52 F. 830, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1892))).
17 Infra Section I.B.
18 Aquazzura v. Ivanka Trump Settle Suit, FASHION LAW (Nov. 18, 2017), http://www.
thefashionlaw.com/home/a-trumped-up-trial-aquazzura-v-ivanka-trump [https://perma.cc/8RXJ-ER9W];
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holds a design patent for the design of one of its popular shoes,19 known as
the Christy, which comes in both flat and pump versions.20 As we detail
below, design patent claims consist of drawings, which are typically made
early and independently of any dispute. Aquazurra’s design patent claims to
the Christy are shown below in the left two pictures in Figure 3. One version
of the Christy marketed by Aquazurra is shown on the right in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Aquazzura Christy Design Patent21 and As Sold22

After Aquazzura’s Christy shoes achieved success in the market, Ivanka
Trump began selling her Tropica shoe, shown in Figure 4. The Tropica shares
some design elements with the shoe depicted in Aquazzura’s design patent,
particularly similar lacing, straps, and overall shape. Yet there are also
differences in the lacing and strap pattern. Most obviously, Trump’s Tropica
laces pass through three sets of eyelets, whereas Aquazurra’s Christy laces pass
through only two sets.23 Thus, the Tropica is not identical to Aquazurra’s

see also Second Amended Complaint at 2, Aquazzura Italia SRL v. Trump, No. 16-4782 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
2017), 2017 WL 1506103 (bringing trademark and design patent infringement claims); Aquazzura Adds Design
Patent Infringement Claim to Trump Lawsuit, FASHION LAW (Nov. 4, 2016 [hereinafter Trump Lawsuit]),
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/aquazzura-adds-design-patent-infringement-claim-to-trump-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/J2ZX-UCZ3] (“Even more recently, Aquazzura has expanded the breadth of its trade
dress infringement suit against Trump, opting to add a design patent infringement claim to the mix,
as well.”). At the time of settlement, Aquazzura had limited its claims to those for infringement of
the design of another shoe, the Wild Thing, despite media reports that it was also asserting
infringement claims of the Christy design.
19 U.S. Patent No. D750,359.
20 Aquazzura Awarded Design Patent for Hot-Selling Shoe Design, FASHION LAW (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/aquazzura-awarded-design-patent-protection [https://perma.cc/
A5RJ-XL63].
21 U.S. Patent No. D750,359.
22 Trump Lawsuit, supra note 18.
23 See Real vs. Steal—Aquazzura Christy Lace-Up Flats, IN THEIR CLOSET (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://intheircloset.com/aquazzura-christy-lace-up-pointed-toe-flats [https://perma.cc/N6FV-PSS3]
(listing many other knockoff versions of the Aquazzura Christy shoe, and observing that Trump’s
Tropica version is not identical, though it is similar).
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claimed design. While design patent infringement does not require identity,24
the design against which a court will have to compare the Tropica is not open
to new depiction within the context of litigation.
Figure 4: Ivanka Trump’s Tropica Shoe25

These examples highlight significant differences between the trademark
and design patent claiming regimes. One difference has to do with the timing
of claims. Depending on the regime, claiming can happen shortly after design
creation or well after commercialization. And it can happen in the context of a
design patent application filed independently of any dispute or in the context
of a particular assertion of rights. Another difference relates to claim format.
Design patent claiming is entirely visual, whereas trade dress claiming is verbal.
Both types of claims can vary in terms of the claim’s level of generality. These
differences in timing and format interact with and complicate the several other
dimensions along which claiming in intellectual property can differ.26
A party’s claiming choices can be consequential for the scope of its rights
in a design, and they can shape legal and business incentives. Design patent
law forces claimants to think through the scope of their claimed rights at the
time of application, which may be early in the design’s lifecycle. At that point,
it may be relatively difficult for the designer to anticipate the range of
alternative designs competitors might develop. Early claiming might also
force a designer to think more carefully, and at an earlier stage, about the ways
it is likely to market the design and about the extent and nature of
competition the design will face. Conversely, later claiming allows for greater
experimentation with different designs and more opportunity to assert rights
Infra Section I.A.
MACY’S, Ivanka Trump Tropica Lace-Up Flats, https://www.macys.com/shop/product/ivankatrump-tropica-lace-up-flats?ID=4654617 [https://perma.cc/UKA9-7455] (last visited Aug. 29, 2018).
26 See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 719
(2009) [hereinafter Fromer, Claiming] (discussing the various dimensions of claiming in patent and
copyright, including central, peripheral, characteristic, and exemplar claiming).
24
25
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strategically as the competitive environment develops. In terms of claim
format, visual claiming tends to focus viewers on a design’s gestalt—though
perhaps in skewed ways—rather than individual features. Verbal claiming
likely does the opposite.
As we discuss below, both design patent and trademark’s claiming
regimes have significant shortcomings, just as copyright’s does, particularly
in terms of the quality of notice the claims provide to third parties about
their scope. Those notice problems are worsened by the frequent cumulation
of rights in the same design. Claim ambiguity and parties’ ability to switch
back and forth between different design claims—both within and across legal
regimes—makes it difficult for courts or third parties to evaluate the validity
and scope of rights. There is significant irony here because intellectual
property claims exist almost entirely to provide notice, whether to
government officials or third parties ascertaining protectability or
determining the scope of rights.27 Cumulation also enables design
rightsholders to assert rights in one or more regimes using the claiming rules
that benefit them most at a particular moment, without any real risk that its
claiming choices will bind it in future rights assertions.
Importantly, the problems with the claiming regimes in these areas and
the costs of variation in claiming methodology across systems are not the
result of considered policy judgments by which the costs were accepted as
regrettable byproducts of important policy gains. Design protection is
relatively new in trademark law, and courts’ inability to develop a clear and
consistent claiming methodology in this area is a consequence of their
expansion of trademark subject matter and infringement doctrine.28
Copyright’s protection for design has long been uneven, particularly in light
of the difficulties courts have had with the concept of separability in the
context of useful articles.29 And copyright’s extremely low originality bar,
along with its loosening infringement standard, has put more pressure on
courts to identify the protectable features of the works at issue.30 While the
design patent statute is old, use of that system has become far more popular

27 See generally Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 731 (“In essence, claiming helps the public
assess what remains in the public domain and what has been made private.”). The format of claiming
can affect the quality of notice, as well as ascertainment of scope and the ability to cover works
grounded in after-developed technologies. Id. at 757-71.
28 For a description of trademark law’s growth and its connection to increasingly challenging
issues regarding the scope of rights, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2197, 2215-16 (2016) [hereinafter Lemley & McKenna, Scope].
29 See infra Section I.C.
30 Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2214-15.
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in recent years,31 and claimants have used it much more commonly for partial
designs.32 These developments have made claiming in each area both more
important and more difficult, and they have dramatically increased instances
of overlapping protection. Thus, in our view, the problems with claiming in
these areas, and especially their relationship to the problem of overlap, were
largely accidental and, until now, mostly unconsidered.
In this Article, after setting out the features of the different claiming
regimes of design patent, trademark, and copyright laws, we evaluate several
dimensions of the differences between those claiming regimes, focusing
primarily on timing, mode of depiction, and level of abstraction. In addition to
identifying several improvements to each claiming regime, we analyze various
approaches to ameliorating the amplified costs of overlapping protection. In
particular, we focus on doctrines of election and channeling rules as alternative
methods of directing designs to one regime or another. We also introduce the
possibility of transsubstantive intellectual property claiming rules as a way to
reduce important inconsistencies across these regimes while also allowing
protection under multiple regimes. Each of these solutions would alleviate at
least some of the concerns we identify, though one’s preference among them
will likely depend on one’s level of concern about overlapping rights.
I. CLAIMING DESIGNS IN THE LAW
Given the range of activities and artifacts we colloquially refer to as
“design”—furniture design, game design, web design, floral design, and even
the design of processes—the category of “design” can sometimes feel like it
refers to everything and therefore nothing.33 Designers and scholars of
design tend to use the term expansively: for example, Karl Ulrich defines
design as “conceiving and giving form to artifacts that solve problems.”34
Intellectual property law is not much more precise. Design patent,
trademark, and copyright laws use varying labels to identify types of design

31 See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion’s Function in Intellectual
Property Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 104 (2017) (“[S]eeking and asserting design patent
protection for fashion designs has become increasingly popular.”).
32 See Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2017)
[hereinafter Burstein, “Article of Manufacture” in 1887] (describing the once-narrower subject matter
of design patent law); Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” Today, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 781,
781-88 (2018) [hereinafter Burstein, “Article of Manufacture” Today] (describing modern design patent
law’s more expansive definition of the article of manufacture, and explaining that partial claiming is
popular because it allows patent owners to protect their inventions even when the defendant’s
product is not identical).
33 KARL T. ULRICH, DESIGN: CREATION OF ARTIFACTS IN SOCIETY 1-2 (2011).
34 Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).
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subject to protection, though they do so without conceptual clarity regarding
the boundaries between categories.
Design patents are available for any “new, original and ornamental design
for an article of manufacture.”35 As Sarah Burstein demonstrates, courts once
had a reasonably constrained idea of what “article[s] of manufacture” were,
and configurations and surface ornamentations of those things were
patentable.36 But modern design patent law is more capacious: The Supreme
Court recently defined an article of manufacture as “simply a thing made by
hand or machine.”37 Thus, the design of anything made by hand or machine
is design patent subject matter.
Trademark law also protects designs, primarily as trade dress.38 The law
protects both product packaging and product design but subjects them to
different legal treatment. Packaging is capable of being considered inherently
distinctive and thus immediately protectable, but design is protectable only
when it has “acquired distinctiveness” or “secondary meaning.”39 The
Supreme Court developed this significant distinction, however, without
defining either product design or packaging.40
And copyright law protects the broad class of “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” which includes
“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”41 Thus, copyright seems to embrace
much of what we might ordinarily consider “design.” But, among other
limitations, the design of a useful article is copyrightable only to the extent
that its features are “separable” from the utilitarian aspects of the article.42
35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012).
Burstein, “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, supra note 32, at 83 (arguing that courts understood
“article of manufacture” to mean a “tangible item made by humans—other than a machine or
composition of matter—that had a unitary structure and was complete in itself for use or for sale”).
37 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016).
38 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765-67 (1992) (holding that inherently
distinctive, nonfunctional trade dress is protectible under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act without proof
of secondary meaning). We say primarily because there is a design element to many logos and stylized
trademarks, which are not trade dress.
39 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-16 (2000) (“[I]n an action
for infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is
distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.”). A mark acquires
the requisite secondary meaning when “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a
product feature . . . is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.” Christian
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, 696 F.3d 206, 216 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)).
40 The Supreme Court acknowledged this problem, but instead of defining the categories, it
simply created a default rule, instructing courts to treat ambiguous subject matter as product design
and require secondary meaning. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215.
41 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
42 Id. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates . . . features that
35
36
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Congress intended the separability requirement to distinguish applied art
from industrial design, making copyright protection potentially available for
the former but channeling the latter to design or utility patent protection.43
The Supreme Court recently defined applied art as “art employed in the
decoration, design, or execution of useful objects.”44 It defined design as “the
combination of details or features that go to make up” a useful article.45
Notably, the Court did not attempt to define industrial design.
We mean here to focus on the various types of designs that design patent,
trademark, and copyright laws address, despite those regimes’ lack of clear
definitions.46 Of course, each of those regimes has a somewhat distinct
justification. Design patent law is generally thought—or at least originally
was thought—to encourage the creation of industrial design.47 By contrast,
trademark law enables mark owners to reap the reputational benefits of their
goods or services by preventing consumer confusion about the source of those
goods.48 And copyright law aims to encourage the production and
dissemination of artistic and cultural works.49 Despite these different
purposes, design patent, trademark, and copyright laws not only all protect
design, they commonly protect the same aspects of a design. Before turning
to that overlap in protection, we first consider claiming in design patent,
trademark, and copyright laws respectively.
A. Design Patent Claiming
The inventor of “any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture” may obtain a design patent, subject to requirements of novelty
and nonobviousness.50 The Federal Circuit has interpreted “ornamental” to
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.”).
43 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
44 Id. at 1014 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
45 Id. at 1009 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
46 We do not address here sui generis protection for semiconductor chips or boat hulls, which
are defined more precisely. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901(a)(1)–(3) (2012) (protecting semiconductor chip
products); id. §§ 1301(a)(2), (b)(4) (protecting original designs of boat hulls).
47 See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1871) (noting that patent law seeks to
secure for a limited time the economic benefits flowing from a new and original product to its
creator); McKenna & Strandburg, Progress, supra note 6, at 31-32 (discussing Congress’s motive in
filling a “perceived vacuum of protection” for design patents not otherwise protected by copyright,
patent, or trademark laws when passing the 1842 design patent statute).
48 See, e.g., Mark McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV.
63, 66-72 (2009) (describing this conceptual framing of trademark law before criticizing parts of it).
49 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 74-76
(2014) (“[C]opyright law provides the incentive of exclusive rights for a limited duration to authors
to motivate them to create culturally valuable works.”).
50 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012).
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mean nonfunctional.51 Because features are functional under prevailing case
law only when they are “dictated by function,” ornamentality is not a
significant limitation on patentability;52 nor are design patent’s novelty and
nonobviousness requirements, particularly relative to the parallel
requirements in utility patent law.53
Design patents last for fifteen years from the date of grant.54 The owner
of a design patent has a right to prevent others from using a similar design
“if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser
usually gives, [the] two designs are substantially the same, [and] the
resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase
one supposing it to be the other.”55
To get a design patent, the inventor must apply to the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), which examines the claimed design for
patentability.56 Because design patent law incorporates most of the legal
rules applicable to utility patents—including a rule that generally grants
priority to the first to file for a patent on a design57—inventors have an
incentive to seek design patent protection expeditiously.58 As a result, the
information in a design patent application is likely to be developed early in
the commercialization timeline, frequently before competitors enter the
51 Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[I]f other designs
could produce the same or similar functional capabilities, the design of the article in question is
likely ornamental, not functional.”).
52 Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion’s Function, supra note 31, at 100 n.269; see also Mark P. McKenna
& Christopher Jon Sprigman, What’s In, and What’s Out: How IP’s Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 491, 520 (2017) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has, since its inception, considered the
question of whether claimed features lack ornamentality more than thirty times. It has found the
claimed design invalid on functionality grounds only five times, most recently in 2001.”).
53 See, e.g., McKenna & Strandburg, Progress, supra note 6, at 42 (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s standards for
nonobviousness in design patent law are relatively low, as compared to utility patent standards . . . . [T]he
Federal Circuit’s approach comes dangerously close to collapsing obviousness and novelty altogether.”).
54 35 U.S.C. § 173.
55 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871); accord Egyptian Goddess, Inc.
v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing, affirming, and applying
the ordinary observer test).
56 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 171; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1504 (9th ed., rev. 8, Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP] (describing the
examination of design patent applications); MATTHEW A. SMITH, DESIGN PATENTS 7 (0.9 ed.
2012), http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2012/12/2012-12-17_design_patents.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SG45-FPMC] (noting the regulations that govern the form of patent applications).
57 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
58 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Dynamic Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1720 (2016)
[hereinafter Fromer, Dynamic Disclosure] (remarking that inventors prefer to file patent applications
promptly “to avoid being blocked from getting a patent by a competing inventor”). In the context
of utility patents, “there are marketplace pressures to rush to patent, in that patent applications and
granted patents readily serve as signals to venture capitalists and other funders that the inventions
at issue are a worthy business investment.” Id. Whether design patents also help attract outside
funding is currently unknown as an empirical matter.
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space. That means that a design patent claim will likely be made
independently of any disputes with competitors that might arise down the
line.59 Design patent applications are not published, so the PTO makes the
claimed design public only once the patent issues,60 which occurs about
twenty months from filing, on average.61
Design patent applications, like applications for utility patents, must
contain a sufficient “written description of the [design], and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and
use the same.”62 The application must also “conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
inventor . . . regards as the [design].”63
Yet because “[t]he design for an article consists of the visual characteristics
embodied in or applied to an article [of manufacture],”64 a design patent
application may include only a single claim for the design, and that claim
must consist of a drawing.65 In essence, then, a design patent’s single claim is
visual.66 The application must have a preamble, which includes the design’s
title (which must “designate the particular article” of manufacture at issue)
and “a brief description of the nature and intended use of the article in which
the design is embodied.”67 But as the PTO makes clear, “[n]o description of
the design in the specification beyond a brief description of the drawing is
generally necessary, since as a rule the illustration in the drawing views is its

59 That said, there might be opportunities to amend claims during patent prosecution to cover
competitors’ products that have since emerged. See Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 OHIO ST. L.J.
107, 115-16 (2016) [hereinafter Burstein, Costly Designs] (“The PTO also allows design patent
applicants to broaden their claims . . . . [T]his strategy allows a design patent applicant to . . .
capture competing products that were introduced after the first design patent application was filed—
even if those competing products did not infringe the original patent claim.”).
60 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(iv).
61 Robert C. MacKichan III, Despite Increased Hiring, Design Patent Application Backlog Builds,
FINNEGAN: PROSECUTION FIRST BLOG (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/
blogs/prosecution-first/despite-increased-hiring-design-patent-application-backlog-builds.html
[https://perma.cc/378C-NHGS].
62 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
63 Id. § 112(b).
64 MPEP, supra note 56, § 1502.
65 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.152–53(a) (2012). This is in contrast to utility patents, which can—and very
often do—conclude with multiple verbal claims. MPEP, supra note 56, § 1502.01(C).
66 MPEP, supra note 56, §§ 1503.01.II, 1504.04.
67 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.153(a), 1.154(b)(1). The preamble is generally thought not to have any legal
effect, and it is therefore unclear whether the depicted design is limited to the context suggested by
the preamble language. Sarah Burstein, The Patented Design, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161, 179-207 (2015).
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own best description.”68 Thus, the drawing takes precedence over everything
else in a design patent application.69
A design patent claim can be directed to configuration or to surface
ornamentation.70 Moreover, an applicant can claim the design of an entire
object or specific features thereof.71 The scope of the claim is defined by what
is drawn in solid lines.72 By contrast, broken lines are used to represent
“[s]tructure that is not part of the claimed design, but is considered necessary
to show the environment in which the design is associated.”73 Visual aspects
depicted with broken lines are therefore unclaimed.74 Thus, in the drawing
on the left in Figure 5, the claim is limited to certain design features of the
upper portion of the boot; the shape of the button and the design of the lower
part of the boot are not claimed. By contrast, the drawing on the right in
Figure 5 is entirely in solid lines. It therefore reflects a claim to every aspect
of the design of the multi-dimensional pocket tool.
Figure 5: Drawings from Deckers’ Upper Boot Patent75 (Left) and a Utility
Tool76 (Right)

MPEP, supra note 56, § 1503.01.II.
See id. §§ 1503-02 (“[T]he drawing or photograph constitutes the entire visual
disclosure of the claim . . . .”).
70 Id. § 1502 (identifying both configuration and surface ornamentation as design patent subject matter).
71 See Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 59, at 114 (noting that a design patent applicant does
not need to claim an “entire article of manufacture”).
72 MPEP, supra note 56, § 1503.02.III ¶ 15.50 (requiring solid lines for the “ornamental design
which is being claimed” and prohibiting broken lines even for “unimportant or immaterial features”
so long as they are “portions of a claimed design”).
73 Id. § 1503-02.III.
74 Id. For further detail on the meaning of solid and broken lines in design patents, see Burstein,
Costly Designs, supra note 59, at 114-16, which discusses priority determinations with regard to
continuation applications when a solid line in an earlier application is later changed to a broken line.
75 U.S. Patent D599,999 fig.2.
76 U.S. Patent D707,091 fig.7.
68
69
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Perhaps counterintuitively, depicting some aspects of the article in broken
lines makes the claim broader rather than narrower. The drawing of the boot
design above claims an upper portion of a boot with some sort of fastening
device, but it covers use of those design features no matter the size or shape
of the button and no matter the design of the lower part of the boot.77 Had
the drawing depicted the boot entirely in solid lines, the shape and size of the
button and the design of the lower portion of the boot would have been
relevant constraints on the scope of the claim.
Despite the overwhelming visual orientation of design patent claiming
rules, images rarely speak for themselves, so verbal descriptions of claimed
designs feature prominently in design patent litigation.78 Yet the formal role
of verbal description is quite unclear.
In virtually every doctrinal context, courts insist that excessive reliance
on verbal description should be avoided because of “the risk of placing undue
emphasis on particular features of the design and the risk that a finder of fact
will focus on each individual described feature in the verbal description rather
than on the design as a whole.”79 The Federal Circuit has thus repeatedly
underscored that “a design is better represented by an illustration than it
could be by any description and a description would probably not be
intelligible without the illustration.”80
Nevertheless, despite courts’ general disfavor of verbal description, it
turns out to be impossible to avoid. Courts cannot evaluate the validity of a
claimed design without identifying and describing aspects of the design and
comparing them to features of prior art designs. Nor can they assess
infringement without describing similarities and dissimilarities between
77 MPEP, supra note 56, § 1503.02.III ¶ 15.50.01 (“Environmental structure may be illustrated
by broken lines in the drawing . . . .”).
78 See Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images in Design Patents, 19 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 409, 418 (2012) [hereinafter Tushnet, The Eye Alone] (explaining that although the Federal Circuit
“endorsed the idea that the images should be allowed to speak for themselves,” courts use verbal
description where juries “would not know how to interpret without [verbal] instruction”).
79 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 680 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
80 Id. at 679 (quoting Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Nonobviousness is an outlier on this issue because in that context a court’s failure
to reduce the design to verbal description is error. See High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct,
Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding that the district court described the design at “too
high a level of abstraction,” and remanding for the district court to “add sufficient detail to its verbal
description of the claimed design to evoke a visual image consonant with that design”); Apple, Inc.
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1329-33 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (concluding that the district court
viewed the references in the obviousness context “from too high a level of abstraction”); cf. MRC
Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter Mfg., LLP, 747 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that even though
“the district court did not expressly undertake to translate the claimed design into a verbal
description,” that did not constitute error because “[i]t [was] entirely clear from the district court’s
opinion what it considered to be the relevant design characteristics of the . . . patented design”).
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features of the accused product and those of the claimed design. Thus, while
courts often cling to the Federal Circuit’s suggestion that descriptions are not
intelligible without the accompanying illustrations, the cases demonstrate
that the opposite is about as true: design patent drawings may not be
intelligible without some description.
Take, for example, the Federal Circuit’s discussion of novelty in a case
involving foam clogs sold under the Crocs brand name.81 In that case, the
court emphasized that the claimed design should be compared to a prior art
reference holistically, without focusing on individual design elements
described in words.82 But the court then proceeded to identify and highlight
particular design features (shown in Figure 6) and compare them to features
of a prior art reference, concluding that the differences may be significant:
The Crocs ’789 patent, as shown . . . in the figure on the left, contains a long,
U-shaped dimpling pattern on the insole. In contrast, the patents-in-suit
[including the ’263 patent] . . . have a dimpling pattern that includes multiple
short rows of dimples. Because we cannot say that these differences are
insignificant as a matter of law, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether the designs would be viewed as substantially similar in the eyes of
the ordinary observer armed with the knowledge of the prior art.83

Figure 6: Croc Design Patent Claim84
Figure 1 in the ’789 Patent
Figure 6 in the ’789 Patent

Figure 6 in the ’263 Patent

Figure 2 in the ’263 Patent

Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1237-41 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1240 (“[A]pplying the point of novelty test in the context of anticipation . . . creates
the need to canvass the entire prior art to identify the points of novelty.”).
83 Id. at 1242-43.
84 Id. at 1236-1237, 1342.
81
82

2018]

Claiming Design

141

At the same time, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that
“[s]light variations on the number and position of the circular holes on top of
the shoe, the rectangular holes on the toe of the shoe as well as the design of
different shaped rectangles on the sole of the shoe” were insufficient to
preclude a finding of lack of novelty because they did not change the overall
visual impression of the shoe.85
Given the tight relationship between novelty and infringement
standards,86 it should be no surprise that courts are similarly conflicted about
verbal description of the visual claim in the infringement context. Under
Gorham Co. v. White’s canonical infringement test, an accused design is
infringing when it is “substantially the same” as the claimed design such that
the ordinary observer would be deceived into buying the accused design
believing it to be the claimed design.87 Courts are supposed to make this
assessment of similarity holistically. Indeed, the Court emphasized the
ordinary-observer perspective because it believed that experts would fixate on
differences and therefore be reluctant to find infringement.88 Nevertheless,
the Court proceeded to identify and describe similarities and differences
between the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s silverware designs in 284 words of
intricate detail before concluding that the differences were insignificant.89
In its more recent en banc decision in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit emphasized that the ordinary observer should assess
85 Id. at 1243. For another example of courts’ split personality with regard to verbal descriptions
of design patents, this time in the context of assessing ornamentality, see PHG Techs., LLC v. St.
John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1363-68 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
86 Int’l Seaway Trading, 589 F.3d at 1240 (“[T]he same tests must be applied to
infringement and anticipation . . . .”).
87 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871). Until 2008, courts often supplemented the Gorham
infringement standard for design patents with a “point of novelty” inquiry. Under this inquiry, the
court was required to identify the features in the claimed design that made the design patentable
over the prior art so as to focus the comparison between the accused product and the patented design
on the presence or absence of those features. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 1253 (2011) [hereinafter Lemley, Point of Novelty] (describing this test, and analyzing when
assessment of the point of novelty is and is not appropriate in patent law). That approach did not
require courts to offer a complete verbal description of the claimed design, but it did require
identification and verbal description of the features that constituted the point of novelty. Indeed,
the whole idea of the point of novelty test was to draw attention to those features in order to
determine if they were present in the accused product. The Federal Circuit rejected the point of
novelty test in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
88 Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 528 (“Experts, therefore, are not the persons to be deceived
. . . . [Ordinary observers] are the principal purchasers of the articles to which designs have given
novel appearances, and if they are misled, and induced to purchase what is not the article they
supposed it to be, . . . the patentees are injured.”).
89 Id. at 529-31.
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similarity in light of the prior art, and it gave lower courts latitude to describe
the designs verbally.90 According to the Federal Circuit, “a court may find it
helpful to point out, either for a jury or in the case of a bench trial by way of
describing the court’s own analysis, various features of the claimed design as
they relate to the accused design and the prior art,” and as a result, a district
court’s “relatively detailed claim construction will not be reversible error.”91
Indeed, in another case the Federal Circuit approved a district court’s claim
construction that filtered out a hammer design’s unprotectable functional
aspects before comparing the accused product to the patented design, rather
than merely comparing the hammer designs holistically.92
There are at least two related reasons for courts’ frequent verbal
descriptions of designs notwithstanding doctrinal rules that purport to
elevate the design patent drawings above all else. First, many design patent
validity and infringement doctrines require analysis of particular design
features, and application of those doctrines encourages—if it doesn’t
implicitly demand—verbal elaboration. In particular, despite their
legitimate concerns about disaggregation leading decisionmakers to
undervalue a design’s overall creativity, courts must also appropriately
define the scope of a party’s rights in the design, and they cannot do that
without accounting in some way for unprotectable features.93 Second,
courts have to offer reasons for their rulings, and they feel at home in words
and much less so in pictures.94
543 F.3d at 665.
Id. at 679-80.
Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Later decisions,
however, have faulted lower courts for eliminating such features, suggesting that lower courts can
highlight functional features but cannot fully filter them out. See, e.g., Sports Dimension, Inc. v.
Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (rejecting the district court’s claim
construction for filtering out functional aspects of a design for a personal flotation device despite
those aspects being functional and despite emphasizing that the functional aspects cannot form
any part of the claim scope); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (agreeing that the “trigger, torque knob, and activation button elements of the
[claimed surgical instrument] have functional aspects,” but holding that “the district court’s
construction of the Design Patents . . . hav[ing] no scope whatsoever fails to account for the
particular ornamentation of the claimed design”).
93 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683,
717-19 (2012) [hereinafter Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words] (making a similar observation about courts’
treatment of visual works under copyright law).
94 See, e.g., MRC Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter Mfg., LLP, 747 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(emphasizing that “the purpose of requiring district courts to describe the claimed design in words
is so that the parties and appellate courts can discern the trial court’s reasoning in identifying a
primary reference” for assessing nonobviousness); infra subsection II.B.3; cf. Tushnet, The Eye Alone,
supra note 78, at 417 (“The written description does at least attempt to create a reviewable record
and to ask questions that can sometimes be answered on summary judgment. As with copyright
infringement, the ordinary observer test makes design patent infringement findings harder to review
and analyze; as gestalts, they are difficult to dissect.”).
90
91
92
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A pervasive level-of-generality issue further complicates the role of verbal
description. Consider, for example, a recent case involving a patented slipper
design in which the Federal Circuit criticized the district court for
characterizing the design as one for “slippers with an opening for a foot that
can contain a fuzzy (fleece) lining and have a smooth outer surface.”95
According to the Federal Circuit, that description, which was to be used in
assessing nonobviousness, “represent[ed] too high a level of abstraction by
failing to focus on the distinctive visual appearances of . . . the claimed
design.”96 Specifically, the district court failed to “add sufficient detail to its
verbal description of the claimed design to evoke a visual image consonant
with th[e claimed] design,”97 pictured in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Slipper Design Patent Claim98

95 High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
96 Id. (quoting Apple v. Samsung, 678 F.3d 1314, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (ruling similarly with
respect to a district court’s description of an iPad design patent as “a rectangular tablet with four
evenly rounded corners and a flat back”)).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1305.
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In another case, however, the Federal Circuit accepted the level of
generality at which the district court described the similarities and differences
between the claimed design of a football jersey for dogs and the purported
primary prior art reference, depicted in Figure 8.99 The district court had
identified three differences: “(1) the patented design has a V-neck collar where
the Eagles jersey has a round neck; (2) the patented design contains an
interlock fabric panel on the side portion of the design rather than mesh; and
(3) the patented design contains additional ornamental surge stitching on the
rear portion of the jersey.”100 In terms of similarity, the district court
emphasized that both designs have “an opening at the collar portion for the
head, two openings and sleeves stitched to the body of the jersey for limbs,
and a body portion on which a football logo is applied.”101 Likewise, “the
Eagles jersey is made ‘primarily of a mesh and interlock fabric,’” and “it
contains at least some ornamental surge stitching,” both elements found in
the prior art reference.102
Figure 8: Design Patent Claim for Football Jersey for Dogs and Eagles
Jersey Primary Reference103

99 MRC Innovations, 747 F.3d at 1332.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1333.
102 Id. Notably, the Federal Circuit thought

that, in light of the district court’s description of
similarities and differences, its failure to translate the claimed design into a verbal description was
excusable. Id. at 1332.
103 Id. at 1328-30.
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Why was the district court’s description of the differences between the
designs in the latter case appropriate, while the court’s description in the
former case was “at too high a level of generality”? No principles are evident.
Three key features of design patent claiming emerge from this review. First,
with regard to timing, designs are claimed in the design patent application,
typically prior to and independently of any disputes with potential infringers.
In fact, design patent claims can become public, upon patent issuance, even
before the patentee’s associated product arrives on the market.104
Second, the scope of design patent rights is, at least formally, determined
by the design patent drawings. Those drawings set out both claimed and
unclaimed matter by use of solid and broken lines, respectively. Despite
design patent law’s emphasis on visual claims over verbal descriptions, case
law makes clear that verbal description plays an inescapable role in design
patent jurisprudence. The role of verbal description, however, is seriously
complicated by the unpredictability of the level of generality at which a visual
claim should be described.
Third, design patent claims are best categorized as central claims by
exemplar. In previous work, one of us proposed that claims to intellectual
property can be classified along two dimensions: peripheral versus central, and
by characteristic versus by exemplar.105 Peripheral claiming entails delineating
the metes and bounds of the set of protected creations, while central claiming
involves setting out some—but not necessarily all—members of that set.106
Claiming by characteristic “requires a description of the essential properties
of the set’s members,” whereas claiming by exemplar “entails enumerating
particular members of the set of protected embodiments.”107
Because design patent claims are principally visual and singular rather
than comprised of verbal lists of design characteristics, those claims are by

104 In fact, there are websites dedicated to reporting on industries’ or companies’ issued design patents,
sometimes for products that have not yet appeared on the market. See, e.g., Apple Was Granted 4 Design Patents
Today Covering HomePod, an Apple Store Room and More, PATENTLY APPLE (Mar. 13, 2018), http://
www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2018/03/apple-was-granted-4-design-patents-today-coveringhomepod-an-apple-store-room-and-more.html [https://perma.cc/PKS7-G9HZ] (revealing Apple designs for
a retail space, home speaker, laptop device, and charger); Apple Wins Design Patents for Chicago’s Newest Apple
Store and a MacBook with Back Edge USB-C Port, PATENTLY APPLE (Sept. 12, 2017), http://
www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2017/09/apple-wins-design-patents-for-chicagos-newest-apple-storeand-a-macbook-with-back-edge-usb-c-port.html [https://perma.cc/TMC7-8N7Z] (reporting on the design
patent granted to Apple for its storefront in Chicago, among others).
105 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 724-30; cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or
Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1783-87 (2009) [hereinafter Burk
& Lemley, Fence Posts] (exploring peripheral versus central claiming with regard to utility patents).
106 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 726-27.
107 Id. at 727.
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exemplar. That is, one must determine the design’s important features or
characteristics from the design’s visual depiction.
It might seem that design patent claims are peripheral because the
designer drafts her claim to demarcate the bounds of her creation and patent
infringement is determined by reference to that claim.108 But in light of the
infringement standard, the precise contours of a design patent claim do not
strictly limit the scope of a party’s rights. Under Gorham, an accused design
infringes a patented design if “an ordinary observer, giving such attention as
a purchaser usually gives, [would find the] two designs . . . substantially the
same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him
to purchase one supposing it to be the other.”109 That test permits factfinders
to find infringement when features depicted in the design patent claim are
absent from the defendant’s design, or when features absent from the design
patent claim are present in the defendant’s design, so long as the defendant’s
product is similar enough to the claimed design that an ordinary observer
would deem them substantially the same.110 Therefore, we think design patent
claims are better categorized as central rather than peripheral claims.
These features of design patent claiming are distinctive. We return to how
these features affect the design patent regime after describing how parties
claim design in trademark law and copyright law.
B. Trade Dress Claiming
Product design and product packaging are protectable as trade dress,
which, under modern law, is a species of trademarks.111 Unlike design patent
rights, trademark rights arise through use rather than registration.112 Thus,
while the Lanham Act creates procedures for federal registration of marks,113

108 Cf. Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 105, at 1744-46 (analyzing utility patent law as
having peripheral claiming); Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 721-23 (same).
109 See supra text accompanying note 87.
110 Design patent jurisprudence further confirms that claims are central. In one case involving
two design patents, one for a windshield design with four holes and one for one with no holes, the
Federal Circuit ruled that “[c]laiming different designs does not necessarily suggest that the
territory between those designs [here, windshield designs with one to three holes,] is also claimed.”
Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 704 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Yet,
the court continued, the design patents might cover three-holed windshield designs if they are
sufficiently similar. See id. at 705.
111 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209-16 (2000); Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773-74 (1992).
112 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 16:18 (5th ed. 2018) (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017)).
113 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
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unregistered marks are enforceable under federal law on substantially the
same terms as registered marks.114
Like all trademarks, to be protectable, trade dress must be used in
commerce in a way that “identif[ies] and distinguish[es] [a party’s goods]
from those manufactured or sold by others and . . . indicate[s] the source of
the goods, even if that source is unknown.”115 As we noted above, product
packaging is capable of being considered inherently distinctive, but product
design is only protectable if it has acquired secondary meaning.116 Moreover,
trade dress features are not protectable to the extent they are functional,
meaning they are “essential to the use or purpose of the article or . . . affect[]
the cost or quality of the article.”117
There are several distinguishing features of trademark claiming. One is a
function of the fact that trademark rights are not rights in gross; that is, those
rights exist only in relation to the goods or services with which they are
used.118 While trademark rights may be enforced against a somewhat broader
range of uses, the rights remain anchored by the claimant’s use.119 As a result,
unlike patent rights, trademark claims are two dimensional: a party claims a
particular trademark in relation to particular goods or services.
Both of those dimensions matter because the scope of a party’s trademark
rights is determined by assessment of likelihood of confusion through a
multifactor test that measures both the similarity of the marks at issue and
the similarity of the goods.120 Even in cases involving identical goods, use of
a mark does not infringe if it is sufficiently dissimilar from the plaintiff ’s
114 See id. §§ 1114, 1125(a). Indeed, many (perhaps most) trademarks are not registered. Barton
Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark
Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 961-62 (2018).
115 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Likewise, under a more recent addition to the law, they are protectable if
a person has a “bona fide intention to use [them] in commerce and applies to register [them] on the
principal register established by [federal law].” Id.
116 Supra text accompanying notes 38–40.
117 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001).
118 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1976)
(emphasizing that classification is product specific, and that “a term that is in one category for a
particular product may be in quite a different one for another,” using the example of Ivory, which
“would be generic when used to describe a product made from the tusks of elephants but arbitrary
as applied to soap”).
119 See Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 909 (2017) [hereinafter Tushnet, Registering Disagreement] (noting
that although registration requires careful identification of the specimen on which the registrant
is using the trademark, trademark rights are not necessarily limited to the goods or services for
which the mark is registered).
120 Each circuit has its own multifactor test. The tests overlap substantially, however, and all
of them consider the similarity of the parties’ marks and the similarity of goods, among other factors.
See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
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mark.121 Nor is use of an identical mark necessarily infringing if it is for
distinct goods or services.122 For example, PANDORA for internet radio can
coexist with PANDORA for jewelry.123 That kind of coexistence is not the
exception but the rule, and the list of coexisting marks could be expanded
dramatically if we included marks with the same dominant portion and
different generic or descriptive additions: DELTA DENTAL, DELTA
FAUCET, and DELTA AIRLINES; and APPLE COMPUTERS, APPLE
RECORDS, and APPLE VACATIONS.124
Two other distinguishing features of trademark claiming—relating to the
timing and format of claims—are consequences of the fact that federal law
protects both registered and unregistered marks.125 In terms of timing, for
marks that are registered, the particular form of the mark must be claimed in
the application, likely independent of any particular dispute with an alleged
infringer.126 Unregistered marks, on the other hand, are never formally
claimed in any fixed format and ultimately are defined for purposes of an
assertion of rights, and then perhaps not even fully.
That timing difference affects the format of claims, as the PTO has
developed detailed and extensive rules governing the depiction of a mark in
a trademark application.127 Specifically, the PTO requires applicants to
include a verbal description of the mark when the claimed mark (1) contains
a design element; (2) is three dimensional or a configuration of goods or
packaging; (3) includes broken lines to show position or placement or to
indicate that a portion of the product or packaging is not part of the mark; or
(4) includes color.128 These verbal descriptions must be quite detailed.
Indeed, the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure suggests the

121 See Barton Beebe & C. Scott Hemphill, The Scope of Strong Marks: Should Trademark Law
Protect the Strong More Than the Weak?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1356-60 (2017) (classifying
doctrine in this regard).
122 See id. at 1357 (“The hard cases . . . arise . . . where the facts present similar marks or
competing (or related) goods.”).
123 PANDORA, Registration No. 3,173,558; PANDORA, Registration No. 3,613,181.
124 E.g., DELTA DENTAL, Registration No. 1,760,270; DELTA AIR LINES, Registration
No. 970,418; DELTA, Registration No. 2,583,761; APPLE, Registration No. 1,078,312
(registering Apple for computers and computer programs); APPLE VACATIONS, Registration
No. 1,462,268 (listing goods and services as travel agency services).
125 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
126 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2) (2012) (requiring, as part of the application to register, “a drawing
of the mark” and a specification of “the goods in connection with which the mark is used”); id.
§ 1052(b)(2) (requiring a drawing and a description of the goods in connection with which a party
has a bona fide intention to use a mark).
127 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE §§ 807–08 (8th ed. Oct. 2017) [hereinafter TMEP].
128 Id. § 808.01.
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following very long and excruciatingly detailed description of the stylized
mark depicted in Figure 9:
Figure 9: Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure Exemplary
Trademark129

The mark consists of a red background; the stylized word “HOSPITAL” in
white letters outlined in black with the letter “S” in the form of a dollar sign
and letter “L” in the form of a cast; a man with red hair in a green gown with
an orange and silver stethoscope and silver headband mirror; man wearing a
blue cap, gown and mask with silver scissors; silver medical tree with white,
pink, and gold intravenous pouch, fluid and tube; gray and gold crutch; nurse
with yellow hair wearing pink clothing and brown clip board; orange and
black scale with an orange man wearing purple pants and orange robe; nurse
with yellow hair and white clothing pushing a wheelchair with a man in green
clothing with white cast and gold cane; white and blue bed pan; yellow and
black buildings and white signs with stylized words “EMERGENCY
HOSPITAL” in black, and green vegetation; white and pink emergency
vehicle with purple tires; a green air tank, orange stretcher, green golf club
bag with white balls and pink clubs; nurse with yellow hair and blue clothing
holding a white syringe with pink fluid; and an orange man dressed in blue
with a white and red thermometer.130

Despite this formal requirement, many registrations of trade dress lack
any meaningful verbal description. As an example, consider the registration
of the iconic Coca-Cola bottle design, shown below in Figure 10. The
registration depicts the bottle, but it includes only the meager description
that “the mark consists of the three-dimensional configuration of the
distinctive bottle as shown.”131
129
130
131

Id. § 808.02.
Id.
Registration No. 1,057,884.
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Figure 10: Registered Coca-Cola Bottle Design132

In addition to rules regarding the form of the mark depicted in the
application and verbal descriptions, use-based applications must be
accompanied by a specimen of use, and that specimen must demonstrate use
of the mark for which registration is sought.133 That requirement is supposed
to assure a reasonably tight relationship between registration and use because
the applicant must show that it is actually making use of the mark for which
it seeks registration and is not merely trying to reserve the mark.134
An application to register a mark typically claims the mark independently
of any particular dispute. While the form of the mark for which registration
is sought is strategic in the sense that, to the extent possible, the applicant
depicts and describes the mark so as to capture anticipated variations that the
applicant would regard as infringing, it is nearly impossible for an applicant
to claim with the full range of potential uses in mind.
Registered marks stand in sharp contrast to unregistered ones, which are
never formally claimed before a dispute. Obviously, unregistered marks are
used in some particular format, so the use itself provides a kernel of notice as
to the scope of a party’s rights. But that notice can be highly imperfect,
particularly in the context of composite marks (ones with many components),

Id.
TMEP, supra note 127, § 904. The same is ultimately true of applications based on intent
to use because those applications will have to be supported by a statement of use and a specimen
reflecting use of the mark in the format for which registration was sought. Id. §§ 1104, 1109.
134 Yet a party need not always submit a specimen showing use of the mark in the identical form
for which registration is sought. Standard-character marks are understood to encompass all stylizations
of the mark. Id. § 1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, if a party applies to register the mark in standard-character form,
use of that word mark in any format will support the application. Applications to register marks in
stylized form, however, must be supported by specimens showing use of the mark in that form. Id.
§ 807.04(b). That constraint operates even more powerfully on product packaging and design, for which
there is no real analogy to the standard-character mark. There is less flexibility along the goods and
services dimension because the specimen must show use in relation to the claimed goods and services.
132
133
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a category that would include most trade dress. Two Pesos135 is illustrative
here: because Taco Cabana was not required to claim its trade dress
independently of its dispute with Two Pesos, it would have been difficult to
tell before the dispute whether color was an important part of the “not
formally claimed” restaurant design. This problem is especially serious in the
context of design because protectable designs may include many features that
are unprotectable on their own but are protectable as part of the composite.136
It is therefore often difficult to determine which features are important in
defining the scope of a party’s rights.137
This notice problem persists even for registered marks because it turns out
that, despite the intricate rules governing a mark’s description in a trademark
application, the specific form of the registration is mostly unimportant at the
infringement stage. While the existence of a registration confers a presumption
of validity, courts evaluating likelihood of confusion rarely pay attention to the
form of registration, or even to the identified goods or services.138 Instead, courts
focus on consumer understanding of a mark as used in the marketplace because
consumer understanding is more relevant to potential consumer confusion.139
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc.140 is
the exception that proves the rule. In that well-known case, Christian
Louboutin objected to Yves Saint Laurent’s use of a red-lacquered sole on its
monochromatic red shoes.141 Louboutin owned a registration for “a red
lacquered outsole on footwear,” as depicted in Figure 11.142 Louboutin’s
description made clear that “the dotted lines [were] not part of the mark but
[were] intended only to show placement of the mark.”143

See supra text accompanying notes 8–14.
See Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 527 (6th Cir.
2013) (noting the problem of “overall appearance” in the context of protectable trade dress); AmBrit,
Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535-37 (11th Cir. 1986) (demonstrating that colors like royal blue and
materials like silver foil, although not individually protectable, may be protectable as a composite);
Best Cellars Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (reiterating
that while each element of trade dress individually may lack distinctiveness, the combination of
elements may be sufficiently distinctive to merit protection); Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia &
Glenn L. Christensen, An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1048-49 (2009) (arguing that “even for the highly stylized mark, the composite
mark doctrine affords protection only for the design, not for the underlying descriptive word(s)”).
137 For a general discussion of the problem of determining the scope of a mark owner’s rights
when the mark at issue includes unprotectable matter, see Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28.
138 See Tushnet, Registering Disagreement, supra note 119, at 909 (citing relevant cases).
139 Id.
140 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
141 Id. at 213.
142 Registration No. 3,361,597.
143 Id.
135
136
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Figure 11: Illustration from Christian Louboutin Trademark Registration144

Rather than emphasizing the form of the registration (which notably did
not explicitly limit the mark to a contrasting red sole), the Second Circuit
focused on Louboutin’s actual advertising and use, which it believed
demonstrated that secondary meaning existed only with respect to redlacquered soles on shoes in a contrasting color.145 Indeed, rather than defining
Louboutin’s rights by reference to the form of its registration, the court
ordered the PTO to amend the registration to make it conform to consumer
understanding.146 As a consequence, the corrected registration now describes
the mark as “consist[ing] of a red lacquered outsole on footwear that contrasts
with the color of the adjoining (‘upper’) portion of the shoe” (though the
broader original illustration remains).147
Even after the Second Circuit’s decision, the precise scope of Louboutin’s
rights with regard to red-lacquered soles remains underspecified. It’s not only

Id.
Christian Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227-28.
Id. at 228.
Registration No. 3,361,597. Christian Louboutin’s ability to obtain rights in its red-lacquered
soles has been contested, sometimes successfully, in other jurisdictions. Compare Christian Louboutin’s
Red Sole Is Not a Valid Trademark in India, FASHION LAW, (July 18, 2018),
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/christian-louboutins-red-sole-is-not-a-valid-trademark-in-india
[https://perma.cc/7KMK-NDDT] (reporting on the High Court of Delhi’s judgment against
Louboutin), with Eleonora Rosati, BREAKING: CJEU Rules that Louboutin Red Sole Mark Does NOT
Fall Within Absolute Ground for Refusal, IPKAT, June 12, 2018, http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/
2018/06/breaking-cjeu-rules-that-louboutin-red.html [https://perma.cc/QLW5-AVV4] (noting that
the European Union’s Court of Justice held that “a mark consisting of a colour applied to the sole of a
shoe is not covered by the prohibition of the registration of shapes”).
144
145
146
147
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that consumer perceptions can change over time such that rights dependent
on secondary meaning can evolve, but also that legal actors decide scope
iteratively in the context of particular disputes. For purposes of resolving
Louboutin’s claim against Yves Saint Laurent, the court needed to determine
Louboutin’s rights only as against monochromatic women’s pumps with a redlacquered sole. It could do that by emphasizing one particular aspect of
Louboutin’s mark: that the sole contrasts with the upper part of the shoe.148
But, of course, that leaves unanswered questions regarding Louboutin’s rights
with respect to use of red-lacquered soles on women’s flat shoes or men’s shoes
with a contrasting upper, even though Louboutin also sells both types of
shoes.149 Louboutin’s registration is itself ambiguous; it claims the mark for
“women’s high fashion designer footwear,” which would seem to cover flat
shoes, but the drawing depicts a pump (albeit with broken lines).150
Figure 12: Christian Louboutin Greggo Flat Shoe151

148 Notably, it is not even clear why the court was so confident that emphasizing the contrasting
upper was sufficient to resolve the case without a likelihood-of-confusion analysis. Christian
Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228. Infringement does not require use of an identical mark. See, e.g.,
Streamline Prod. Sys., Inc. v. Streamline Mfg., Inc., 851 F.3d 440, 454 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting that
“the more similar the marks, the greater likelihood of confusion,” though the marks may be
distinguishable). Therefore, even if the Louboutin mark was properly limited to contrasting red
soles, use of a red sole in other contexts could still be infringing. The Second Circuit did not even
contemplate this possibility.
149 An example of the latter is shown in Figure 12.
150 Registration No. 3,361,597.
151 Greggo Flat, CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN, http://us.christianlouboutin.com/us_en/shop/men/
greggo-flat.html [https://perma.cc/J5X5-6GZ9] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
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These questions are far from academic, as other designers have used red on
various shoe components that are arguably infringing, as shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13: Stuart Weitzman Women’s Shoe (Left) and Burberry “Splash
Sole” (Right)152

Courts have often demonstrated sensitivity to notice concerns in cases
involving unregistered trade dress and have therefore required trade dress
claimants to describe their trade dress verbally, usually in the complaint.153
Images alone are routinely deemed insufficient,154 and even combinations of
152 Shoes, FASHION CAPE, http://thefashioncape.com/gallery_categories/shoes/ [https://perma.cc/
L4RD-6B6U] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018); Burberry Splash Sole Shoes in Bordeaux, LYST,
https://www.lyst.com/shoes/burberry-splash-sole-shoes-bordeaux/ [https://perma.cc/GA3N-XS4C] (last
visited Sept. 30, 2018).
153 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 415 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting
that the elements of the trade dress should be identified); Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d
754, 768 (6th Cir. 2005) (“To recover for trade-dress infringement under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, a party must first identify what particular elements or attributes comprise the protectable
trade dress.”); Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 634
(6th Cir. 2002) (requiring that the elements of the trade dress be identified separately). But see
Invisaflow, LLC v. Euramax Int’l, Inc., No. 14-3026, 2015 WL 11562084, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4,
2015) (finding that the Eleventh Circuit does not impose a verbal-articulation requirement, but
that the plaintiff ’s description would have sufficed under the Second Circuit’s more difficult
standard); Kee Action Sports LLC v. Valken, Inc., No. 12-6069, 2013 WL 6633439, at *5-7 (D.N.J.
Dec. 17, 2013) (stating that the Third Circuit does not require verbal description and finding that
the plaintiff “sufficiently pled the nature of the claimed trade dress to satisfy the notice
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8”).
154 See, e.g., Tracey Tooker & TT Ltd., Inc. v. Whitworth, 212 F. Supp. 3d 429, 434 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (“Although Tooker has submitted numerous photos of her hats, the Court cannot distill the
distinctive elements of [Tooker]’s trade dress from a collection of photos.”); Oban US, LLC v.
Nautilus, Inc., No. 13-1076, 2014 WL 2854539, at *9 (D. Conn. June 23, 2014) (“[T]he mere
attachment of brochures [and] photographs . . . to the Amended Complaint is not sufficient, as
courts cannot be expected to distill from a set of images those elements that are common to a line
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images and verbal descriptions are often not enough if they do not collectively
identify the protectable elements of the trade dress.155
There is, however, no consistency regarding the level of generality at which
courts enforce this requirement. In Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade
Co.,156 the Second Circuit rejected as too abstract a description of site furniture
that “incorporates large three-inch tubing, with a powdered cosmetic finish,
bent in gentle turns that roll around the perimeter of the furniture which in
combination with the various seating surfaces gives the viewer a floating or
suspended feeling.”157 This description and various statements by Landscape’s
witnesses “fail[ed] to indicate what unique combination of features ma[de] the
trade dress of the ten items in the Petoskey line inherently distinctive.”158
According to the court, “[a] claim for site furniture which is at once massive,
yet appears to float, is too abstract to qualify as trade dress . . . . If the law
protected style at such a level of abstraction, Braque might have prevented
Picasso from selling cubist paintings in the United States.”159
In Premium Balloon Accessories, Inc. v. Creative Balloons Mfg., Inc.,160
however, the Sixth Circuit accepted Premium’s description of its balloon
weight trade dress because “Premium provided pictorial representations of
its trade dress and emphasized the weight (80-100 grams), shape (five-pointed
star), colors (primary), and size of its weight, among other factors.”161 Though
of products and both distinctive and nonfunctional.” (internal quotations omitted)); Weber-Stephen
Prods. LLC v. Sears Holding Corp., No. 13-1686, 2013 WL 5782433, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2013)
(“Weber’s cited cases . . . do not support its position that including pictures of its grills in its
complaint, without detailed description, is enough.”); Heller Inc. v. Design Within Reach, Inc., No.
09 Civ.1909 (JGK), 2009 WL 2486054, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009) (“[I]mages alone do not satisfy
the plaintiff ’s obligation to articulate the distinctive features of the trade dress.”). In some cases,
parties do not even attempt to identify the particular features of their trade dress but simply refer
to images in a design patent and gesture vaguely at the existence of a trade dress. See, e.g., Original
Complaint at 1, 3, Snap-On Inc. v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., No. 16-1265 (E.D. Wis. Sept 21,
2016) (demonstrating that the plaintiff attached images of their product but failed to explicitly
describe the trade dress).
155 See, e.g., Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, No. 14–03954, 2014 WL
6892141, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014) (“Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently described their
trade dress because they have provided a photograph . . . and have provided a written description
. . . . This description and the photograph alone do not sufficiently identify the particular elements
of the packaging they seek to protect.”); Mike Vaughn Custom Sports, Inc. v. Piku, 15 F. Supp. 3d
735, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“[T]he description of the graphics describe the design as functional . . . .
The Court cannot evaluate what the plaintiff considers non-functional if the only factual allegations
describe the product design’s myriad functional purposes . . . . The images do not rescue plaintiff ’s
trade dress claim . . . .”).
156 113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1997).
157 Id. at 381.
158 Id. at 381-82.
159 Id. at 382.
160 573 F. App’x 547 (6th Cir. 2014).
161 Id. at 553.
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the court acknowledged that “Premium’s articulation of its trade dress could
have been more precise—for example, Premium should have stated the size
of its weight,” it found the description adequate.162
In other cases, courts have accepted the plaintiffs’ descriptions without
discussion163 or have crafted their own descriptions based on the evidence
presented.164 One consequence of this inconsistency is that, despite courts’
motivation to improve notice, the descriptions parties offer frequently do not
meaningfully identify the protectable features of the trade dress.165 That can be
true even when the description is long because length doesn’t always
correspond to specificity; indeed, parties often use length to disguise generality.
Here, for example, is Yeti’s very long, but extremely general, description of its
trade dress in its complaint against Blackbird Products Group:
YETI’s trade dress rights in the designs and appearances of the Roadie®
and Tundra® coolers include, but are not limited to, the visual flow of the
Tundra® and Roadie® coolers, the curves and lines in the Tundra® and
Roadie® coolers, the design, style, and appearance of these curves and lines
in the Tundra® and Roadie® coolers, the visual connection and relationship
between one or more of the curves and lines in the Tundra® and Roadie®
coolers, and the style, design, and appearance of one or more design aspects
of the Tundra® and Roadie® coolers, including but not limited to the design
and appearance of the style line on the front of the cooler; the design and
appearance of the style line on the back of the cooler; the design and
appearance of the style line on each side of the cooler; the design and
appearance of the “duck-bill” tapered front corners of the cooler; the design
and appearance of the inverted style line above the name plate and below
the lid; the design and appearance of the ledge around the perimeter of the
cooler; the design and appearance of the rope handles, the design and
appearance of the front, side and rear design of the feet of the cooler; the
placement, design and appearance of the slots on the side, front and rear of
the cooler; the design and appearance of the latches; the design and
appearance of the name plate and name plate lettering; the placement,

Id.
See, e.g., Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 503 (6th
Cir. 2013) (noting the trade dress at issue without further elaboration); Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz
GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 354-56 (5th Cir. 2002) (same).
164 See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting the district
court’s characterization of the trade dress of a Klondike Bar wrapper based on the evidence).
165 Cf. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 117 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “a
plaintiff ’s inability to explain to a court exactly which aspects of its product design(s) merit
protection may indicate that its claim is pitched at an improper level of generality, i.e., the claimant
seeks protection for an unprotectible style, theme or idea” (quoting Landscape Forms, Inc. v.
Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1997))).
162
163
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design, and appearance of the name plate on the front between the two
front style lines; and the color contrast, color combinations, and shapes of
features of the cooler, whether these elements are alone or in any
combination with each other, including the overall look and appearance of
the Roadie® and Tundra® coolers.166

The verbal-description requirement might constrain parties’ claiming in
some cases because a party that claims too broadly risks describing a trade
dress for which it will have trouble satisfying trademark law’s
distinctiveness167 and nonfunctionality requirements.168 Indeed, at the
extreme, courts sometimes do not even recognize vague or underspecified
claims as identifying trade dress at all.169 But that is atypical. More
commonly, courts will construe the plaintiff ’s claims narrowly, so there is little
downside to claiming broadly and strategically. 170
166 Complaint at 5-6, Yeti Coolers v. Blackbird Prods. Grp., LLC, No. 15-1105 (W.D. Tex.
Dec. 7, 2015).
167 See, e.g., Forney Indus., Inc. v. Daco of Mo., 835 F.3d 1238, 1253 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting
that the plaintiff ’s description was too vague to satisfy the distinctiveness requirement); Yankee
Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2001) (granting summary
judgment because the plaintiff did not highlight elements to meet the distinctiveness
requirement); supra text accompanying note 115.
168 Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 79-82 (2d Cir. 1990)
(noting that a defendant may avoid liability through the functionality doctrine, which includes an
inquiry as to whether trade dress protection “will hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of
others to compete effectively in the sale of goods”); see also supra text accompanying note 117. For a
comparison in which a party’s narrow claiming in the registration context saved it from a finding of
functionality, see In re Bottega Veneta Int’l, S.a.r.l., 2013 WL 5655822, at *1, *8-9 (T.T.A.B. Sept.
30, 2013) (finding a basket-weave pattern used on leather products nonfunctional because the
plaintiff had narrowly described the mark as “a configuration of slim, uniformly-sized strips of
leather, ranging from 8 to 12 millimeters in width, interlaced to form a repeating plain or basket
weave pattern placed at a 45-degree angle over all or substantially all of the goods”).
169 See Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds, 791 F.3d 561, 566-67 (5th Cir.
2015) (finding that plaintiff failed to assert a trade dress infringement claim despite allegations that
defendant created a “confusingly similar” web site because the “alleged confusion . . . stems from
the use of a similar service mark (‘Testmasters’), and the false representation that TES offers a
similar service (live LSAT courses offered nationwide)”); Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764
F.3d 303, 309-11 (3d Cir. 2014) (dismissing the plaintiff ’s claim for trade dress infringement when it
had claimed only (1) “a hodgepodge of unconnected pieces of its businesses, which together d[id]
not comprise any sort of composite visual effect” and (2) “web design,” without further specificity).
170 See, e.g., Toyo Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd. v. CIA Wheel Grp., No. 15-0246, 2016 WL 4992111,
at *1-2, *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2016) (finding the plaintiff ’s trade dress nonfunctional after
defining the claim to include only “the two-dimensional pattern created by the blocks—not the three
dimensional structure created by the grooves between the blocks or the placement of thin shallow
channels cut into the blocks known as sipes,” despite the plaintiff ’s description of the trade dress as
“the overall appearance of its . . . tires”); Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N.A., Inc., 703 F.
Supp. 2d 671, 680, 682-83 (W.D. Ky. 2010), aff ’d, 679 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012) (allowing the plaintiff
to narrow the description of its trade dress to emphasize a red dripping wax seal after five years of
litigation in which the plaintiff never claimed red as an element of the mark and despite a registration
that made no reference to color).
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Take the example of a recently filed case in which Lisa Frank, a company
that makes stickers, school supplies, and other products for kids, sued Orb
Factory, which sells similar products.171 A representative sampling of Lisa
Frank’s products is shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Lisa Frank Products172

Compare these samples to the extraordinarily broad way Lisa Frank described
its trade dress in its complaint:
the combination of some or all of the following elements, depending upon
the product and its packaging, that create a unique overall image and distinct
visual impression . . . (1) brightly colored bold graphics of distinctive animal
characters depicted individually or grouped with one or more other such
characters, with rainbow colored features, large eyes, and happy, friendly
expressions; (2) use of brilliant, often rainbow sequenced, colors, graduated
color sequences, and rainbow colors that fade into one another . . . ; (3)
package, cover and product surface designs featuring, in addition to the
distinctive animal characters, combinations of rainbows, flowers, ice cream
cones, butterflies, birds, rabbits, fish, cupcakes, bubbles, peace symbols,
random words, hearts, happy faces, and stars, often in groups including
colorful backgrounds employing rainbow colors, color fades and Lisa [F]rank
pink, props and landscape features such as trees, pools, and snow; and (4)
product packaging incorporating the look and feel of the products.173

171 First Amended Complaint at 6-7, Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Orb Factory Ltd., No. 15-00433, 2017
WL 2655406 (D. Az. Sept. 16, 2015) (alleging that the defendant sells products that are “confusingly
similar” to the plaintiff ’s trade dress).
172 Id. at 7-8.
173 Id. at 5.
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Probably not incidentally, Orb Factory’s products, particularly the ones Lisa
Frank references in the complaint, generally appear as shown in Figure 15.

Figure 15: Orb Factory Products174

In sum, it is difficult to characterize trade dress claiming given the
differentiated claiming regimes for registered and unregistered marks. But
three features stand out. First, regardless of the registration status of the trade
dress at issue, courts focus primarily on consumer understanding and
commercial context rather than the form of a registration. Specifically,
independently of whether trade dress is registered, the scope of a party’s
rights will nearly always be determined by reference to a claim a mark holder
makes in the course of litigation. Trade dress claiming is therefore generally
done late and in the context of particular disputes, which enables strategic
behavior. Moreover, any notice provided by use of the trade dress or by claims
made in a registration is at best imperfect because later claims made in the
context of litigation matter significantly more.175
Second, trademark law generally emphasizes verbal claims over visual
ones, as demonstrated by courts’ threshold requirement of verbal description
as a means for framing distinctiveness and functionality inquiries.176 But the
Id. at 7.
As Rebecca Tushnet suggests, this need not be so. Courts could put greater emphasis on
the form of a registration by requiring that they be more substantive, and in many cases such
emphasis could actually constrain the scope of a party’s rights. Tushnet, Registering Disagreement,
supra note 119, at 929-40.
176 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and Advertising
Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 890-91 (2011) (commenting on the distrust of images in trademark
law and the simultaneous under- and over-inclusiveness of the verbal-description requirement
in trade dress litigation).
174
175
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level-of-generality problem looms large here, just as it does in the design
patent context. In particular, courts have no methodology for determining the
level of generality at which parties must verbally describe their trade dress.
As a result, the descriptions courts accept can vary wildly.
Finally, trade dress claims are best characterized in their varied forms as
central claims, sometimes by characteristic and sometimes by exemplar.
Claims in registration, via use in the marketplace, and in litigation—be they
verbal or visual, early or late—tend to exemplify the trade dress rather than
describe its periphery (whether with regard to the classes of goods or services
to which protection extends or to the scope of the design itself).177 When the
claims come in the form of illustrations or use in the marketplace, they are by
exemplar because others must discern the design’s pertinent characteristics. By
contrast, as the examples above demonstrate, the verbal descriptions provided
to the PTO or to courts tend to be by characteristic, yet they are still central.
C. Copyright Claiming
Designs can also benefit from copyright protection, to the extent they
constitute “original works of authorship fixed in a[] tangible medium of
expression.”178 For most works created after 1977, the copyright lasts for the
author’s lifetime plus seventy years.179 Copyright owners hold several
exclusive rights in relation to their works, including the right to reproduce
the works, prepare derivative works based on them, and distribute copies.180
These exclusive rights are violated not only by identical copying, but also by
the making of substantially similar works.181 According to the Second Circuit,
two works are considered substantially similar if “the ordinary observer,
unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.”182
177 See Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 795-96 (“[A] trademark protects a set of marks.
For example, holding the trademark for ‘Pledge’ furniture wax allows the holder to prevent
others from using ‘Promise’ as a mark for furniture wax. Trademark claims—contained in
registrations with the PTO—thus seem to be central. And they have a mix of exemplar
claiming—the mark itself—and characteristic claiming—the sorts of goods and services to which
the mark can be applied.” (footnote omitted)).
178 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
179 Id. § 302(a). Anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire have a fixed
term of either 95 years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date of creation, whichever
expires first. Id. § 302(c).
180 Id. § 106.
181 See, e.g., Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007); Whitehead v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 1999) (“[Plaintiff] has provided no direct
evidence of copying, so he has the burden of establishing both substantial similarity and access.”)
182 Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
When a plaintiff’s work consists in part of public-domain elements, the Second Circuit further refines
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Claiming in copyright law shares some features of design patent claiming
and some of trademark claiming. It is like design patent claiming in that one
claims one’s work as is, not with regard to its later use or reception in the
marketplace (as with trademark law).183 But unlike design patent claiming
and like trademark claiming, copyright typically does not require any “formal”
claim beyond the work itself until a dispute occurs. Copyright does not
require formal claims because works are protectable immediately upon
fixation; formalities are not a prerequisite.184 In that sense, as one of us has
previously observed, “the copyrighted work stands in as a central claim by
exemplar for the set of works that are substantially similar or derivative.”185
That is, the copyrighted work itself is used as the prototype against which all
allegedly infringing works are compared to see if they share sufficient salient
characteristics to fall within the scope of the copyright holder’s rights.186
Despite copyright law’s ostensible rejection of formalities, registration is
still encouraged and is a requirement for instituting an infringement action.187
Unlike design patent and trademark applications, however, copyright
applications are not meaningfully examined.188 And unlike issued design
patents and trademark registrations, copyright registrations do not contain
any essential information about the claimed aspects of the copyrighted work;
the registrations instead consist primarily of administrative data like
information about the registrant, the work’s title, its completion date, and
publication date (if any).189
Moreover, because the copyright infringement standard allows for
findings of infringement based on partial or fragmented similarity,190 the
copyrighted work itself often gives very little insight about the particular
its test to require “substantial similarity between those elements, and only those elements, that
provide copyrightability to the allegedly infringed” work. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
183 Supra Sections I.A–B. As we discuss below, infringement in both copyright and design
patent laws is determined by reference to audience reaction, which complicates this understanding.
184 See Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 743-52 (analyzing copyright law as a system of
claiming by exemplar, with some claiming by characteristic in licensing); Christopher Sprigman,
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 539-45 (2004) [hereinafter Sprigman,
Reform(aliz)ing] (discussing the U.S. move away from copyright formalities).
185 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 748.
186 Id. at 748-49.
187 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2012) (describing the procedures for registering copyright); id. § 411
(requiring registration as a prerequisite to a civil infringement action, with some exceptions).
188 See Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 337-38
(2012) (explaining why copyright applications are not subject to extensive review).
189 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 745 n.136.
190 Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that a larger work that copies
“only a small part of the copyrighted work but do[es] so word-for-word” may still be found to
infringe); see Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement,
112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1268-72 (2014) [hereinafter Fromer & Lemley, Audience] (discussing courts’
varying tests for substantial similarity); Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2231-39 (same).
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claimed aspects of a work.191 As a result, copyright owners typically identify
the protected characteristics of their works only in the context of litigation.192
As with trademark claiming for the first time in litigation, this claiming can
be strategically targeted to cover the defendant’s allegedly infringing works.
The lack of claiming methodology and resulting opportunity for strategic
behavior can lead to a free-for-all in copyright claiming. As just one example,
consider the Supreme Court’s recent Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands,
Inc.193 decision, which focused on copyright law’s useful articles doctrine.
Varsity Brands sued Star Athletica for infringing five cheerleading uniform
designs.194 The Varsity Brands design team originally sketched those designs
on paper, later producing at least two completed uniforms based on the
designs. Varsity Brands then registered a copyright in each of the five
designs.195 It registered three of the designs as “2-dimensional artwork,” for
which it submitted sketches as deposit copies; the other two it registered as
“2-dimensional artwork” in the nature of “fabric design (artwork),”
submitting for each a photograph of a completed uniform incorporating the
design.196 One of the registration submissions is depicted in Figure 16.

Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 782-83.
Id.
137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
Id. at 1007.
Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *2 (W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
196 Id.
191
192
193
194
195
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Figure 16: One of Varsity Brands’ Claimed Cheerleading Uniform Designs197

In its complaint, Varsity Brands included photographs of the allegedly
infringing designs from Star Athletica’s catalog. For example, it asserted that
Star Athletica’s design shown in Figure 17 infringed Design 078 in Figure 16.
Figure 17: Star Athletica’s Allegedly Infringing Design198

197 Joint Appendix at 32, Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir.
2015) (No. 15-866) [hereinafter Star Athletica Joint Appendix], 2016 WL 3924018.
198 Id. at 33.
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Note that Star Athletica’s allegedly infringing design is not identical to
Varsity Brands’. Varsity Brands’ side panels are white, whereas Star Athletica’s
are light blue. Both stripe patterns have the same colors, but the patterns
themselves are different. The skirt designs are also different. Perhaps for this
reason, Varsity Brands claimed its design holistically in the complaint,
referring only to Design 078 depicted in Figure 16. At various points during
the litigation, Varsity Brands referred verbally to the aspects of this design it
thought were copyrightable: “the lines, stripes, coloring, angles, V’s [or
chevrons] and shapes and the arrangement and placement of those
elements.”199 Varsity Brands almost certainly described its design at this high
level of generality so that it would encompass non-identical designs like Star
Athletica’s. And that proved to be successful, as every court that ruled on
Varsity Brands’ claims accepted its description, characterizing Varsity Brands’
works in terms of the “graphic features of Varsity [Brands’] designs—the
arrangement of stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking.”200
Interestingly, when it needed to describe its designs verbally in order to
overcome the Copyright Office’s initial refusal to register them, Varsity
Brands did so with much greater specificity. Take, for example, its description
of another design, Design 538:
DESIGN 538 . . . has a central field of black bordered at the bottom by a
gray/white/black multistripe forming a shallow “vee” of which the left-hand
leg is horizontal, while the right-hand leg stretches “northeast” at
approximately a forty-five degree angle. Below the upward-angled leg of the
shallow “vee” is a similarly angled wider white stripe, succeeded by an area
of black. The central field of black is bordered on top by an “X” figure formed
of the same gray/white/black multistripe that appears at the bottom, with the
colors reversed. Above the “X” is a field of white; the wedges at either side
of the “X” are subdivided horizontally into approximately equal-sized wedges
of black over white.201

Varsity Brands claimed Design 538 with this level of specificity
because the Copyright Office might otherwise have believed that the

199 Id. at 242; accord id. at 284 (emphasizing “the lines, stripes, coloring, angles, V’s and shapes
and the arrangement and placement of those elements”); cf. id. at 237 (referring to all five designs as
“compris[ing] original combinations, positionings, and arrangements of elements which include V’s
(chevrons), lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted V’s, coloring, and shapes, etc.”).
200 Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 491; accord Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct.
1002, 1012 (2017) (characterizing Varsity’s copyright claim as centering on “the arrangement of colors,
shapes, stripes, and chevrons on the . . . cheerleading uniforms”); Varsity Brands, 2014 WL 819422,
at *9 (referring to Varsity Brands’ copyright claim as directed to “the lines, patterns, and chevrons”).
201 Star Athletica Joint Appendix, supra note 197, at 140.
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design lacked originality202 or was an unprotectable useful article, as we
discuss below.203 By claiming narrowly, Varsity Brands apparently
thought—probably correctly—that the Copyright Office would be more
likely to acknowledge an original and copyrightable contribution.
Yet the contrast between Varsity Brands’ different claims is striking.
When it sought to establish copyrightability at the Copyright Office—making
its claim independently of any purported infringement—Varsity Brands
claimed narrowly. But when it sued Star Athletica, Varsity Brands claimed far
more generally to make it easier to establish infringement. And it could
manipulate its claim strategically in this way without fear that its narrower
early claim would be held against it.
The difference in generality of claims matters because the Supreme
Court’s approach in Star Athletica puts significant pressure on claiming in
cases involving useful articles. A useful article is a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work “having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”204 Copyright
law denies protection to features of a useful article unless the article
“incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.”205
According to the Supreme Court, features are separable when they
(1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from
the useful article, and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work—either on [their] own or fixed in some other tangible medium
of expression—if [they] were imagined separately from the useful article.206

In the process of evaluating Varsity Brands’ designs under this rule, the
Court implicitly differentiated between designs on useful articles, which can
be imagined separately even if they correspond to the shape of the article,
and the design of an article, which cannot be so imagined.
Yet the question of whether Varsity Brands’ designs were surface
ornamentation (design on) or instead depicted the configuration of
cheerleading uniforms divided courts at every level of the litigation.207
Indeed, each of the three opinions in the Supreme Court reflected a different
understanding of Varsity Brands’ claimed design. According to the majority,
See supra text accompanying note 178.
See infra text accompanying notes 204–05.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Id.
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
For more on this issue, see Mark P. McKenna, Knowing Separability When We See It, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 127, 131-32 (2017).
202
203
204
205
206
207
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Varsity Brands claimed “surface designs” consisting primarily of
“‘combinations, positionings, and arrangements of elements’ that include
‘chevrons . . . , lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted [chevrons],
coloring, and shapes.’”208 Those surface designs simply “correspond[ed] to the
shape of the useful article[s]” (the cheerleading uniforms).209 Justice
Ginsburg took the “surface design” theme even further in her concurrence, in
which she described the designs as “standalone pictorial and graphic works
that [Varsity Brands] reproduce[d] on cheerleading uniforms.”210 In her view,
those standalone works were not designs of useful articles, and separability
analysis was therefore not even necessary. Justice Breyer saw things quite
differently. In his view, the designs inescapably depicted cheerleading
uniforms because Varsity Brands did not merely claim a series of chevrons
and stripes; instead, it claimed chevrons and stripes “as they [were] arranged
on the neckline, waistline, sleeves, and skirt of each uniform.”211
That variation in understanding of the relevant designs matters
enormously. Despite the majority’s insistence that “two-dimensional artistic
features on the surface of useful articles” are not “inherently separable,”212 it
is hard not to see as dispositive the majority’s characterization of Varsity
Brands’ works as surface designs applied to cheerleading uniforms. It is,
however, entirely unclear why that characterization is the most natural one.
Among other things, the correct understanding of Varsity Brands’ claims
turns in significant part on whether we focus on the images in the deposit
copies Varsity Brands submitted with its applications to register the designs
or instead on Varsity Brands’ later characterization of those designs.
The majority’s description of Varsity Brands’ works as drawings of various
features in some arrangement ignores the reality of the images submitted to
the Copyright Office. Those images do not simply depict chevrons and lines;
they depict cheerleading uniforms with particular design features. That, of
course, does not necessarily mean that Varsity Brands claimed every aspect of
what is shown in the deposit copy images, but uncertainty about what the
images reflect is precisely the problem. Copyright registration does not
require visual demarcation of the claimed features, nor does it require a clear
verbal identification of those features. As a result, one cannot simply look at
a copyright registration and determine the scope of the registrant’s claim.213

Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007.
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 1035 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1009.
See Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 745 n.136 (“To register, an applicant must
complete a form with information about the applicant and the work’s title, completion date, and
208
209
210
211
212
213
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This is a potentially significant issue in the context of useful articles—which
many designs are—because the same visual image in a deposit copy could
reflect at least two different types of claims. One might, for example, make a
model of a car and submit an image of that model to claim rights in the
model.214 As the Star Athletica majority noted, the car model would be
copyrightable even if the owner could not enforce its rights against a party that
made an actual car with the same design.215 But one could also submit an image
of the model car and claim features depicted in the image in the same way
Varsity Brands claimed the features depicted in images of its cheerleading
uniforms—as features that might be “applied to” the car itself.216 That is to say
that the very same deposit copy could form the basis of a claim to a particular
depiction of a car—but not the design of an actual car—or to features of an
actual car. Because the registration process does not require delineation of the
claim, third parties cannot really know how a putative copyright owner will
define its claim until litigation.
That timing is a problem because Star Athletica makes separability turn on
whether features of a useful article can be imagined separately as a work of
authorship that is not itself a useful article.217 What features are we to
“imagine” separately, and how do we know whether those features can be
recognized as a work of authorship or instead simply depict the useful article?
The majority had very little to offer on either of those questions; it
simply accepted that Varsity Brands’ design consisted of a combination of
chevrons and other lines arranged in some format. But if we are to assume
that separability implies evaluation of something less than the entirety of
the design, then the first step in the separability analysis must be
identification of the purportedly separable features.218 And surely
identification must at least start with the features the plaintiff claims should
be imagined separately. Here, the lack of claiming methodology in copyright
is likely to pose significant issues.
In particular, the descriptions of the designs at issue are likely to matter
in separability cases because at different levels of abstraction the purportedly
publication date (if any) but nothing about the work’s content or the set of works protected by
the copyright.” (citations omitted)).
214 One could, of course, also claim copyright in the image of the model itself, distinct from the
model. But that image would not be a useful article, so it would not be subject to separability analysis.
215 See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010 (“Although the replica could itself be copyrightable, it
would not give rise to any rights in the useful article that inspired it.”).
216 See id. at 1005 (“§ 113(a) . . . protects art first fixed in a medium other than a useful article
and subsequently applied to a useful article.” (emphasis added)).
217 Id. at 1010.
218 Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion’s Function, supra note 31, at 65-69, 85-93. In fact, the Court made
it clear the decisionmaker must “determine that the separately identified feature has the capacity to
exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article.” Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010.
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separable features are going to look more like works of authorship that can
be imagined separately—or, conversely, more like the platonic form of the
useful article.219 In other words, the level of abstraction of the description is
going to influence whether a court regards the design simply as that of “a
shovel as a shovel,” or instead as an article that consists, at least in part, of
“artistic features that could be perceived as art apart from the shovel, and
which would qualify as protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works on
their own or in another medium.”220
As this discussion indicates, copyright claiming is hard to characterize
precisely because there is so little methodology to it.221 From the moment a
work is fixed until and unless the owner asserts rights in the work, the
copyrighted work itself serves as the copyright claim. The work serves as an
exemplar against which other works are compared to determine infringement.
Because copyright’s infringement standard does not require identity but only
substantial similarity,222 the author’s rights actually extend beyond the four
corners of the work. The work thus serves as a “central claim by exemplar.”223
219 Cf. Mala Chatterjee, Note, Conceptual Separability as Conceivability: A Philosophical Analysis
of the Useful Articles Doctrine, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 558, 558-61 (2018) (using the philosophical framework
of conceivability to analyze which features of useful article are separable).
220 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1013 n.2. As difficult as it may be to develop a consistent claiming
methodology, the alternative is for courts simply to engage in artistic evaluation, as the majority did
for Duchamp’s shovel. Indeed, the only way the Court could confidently have concluded that there
were no separable features of the shovel was to determine (implicitly, and without the benefit of any
claim to particular features) that none of the features of that shovel were sufficiently artistic to “be
perceived as art apart from the shovel.” Id. This is risky business because we have long been told
that it is “a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of [artistic expression], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). The majority’s test at least flirts
with that undertaking; divorcing separability from any particular claim leaves courts with essentially
no other option. Cf. Barton Beebe, Star Athletica and the Problem of Panaestheticism, 9 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3123967 (“[When] the law begins to pursue a separation between the
utilitarian and the aesthetic . . . the law finds itself on . . . the wrong . . . side of that divide, where
it is no longer engaging in legal reasoning . . . . [I]t is engaging in aesthetic thinking about the
meaningful and the beautiful.”).
221 Margot Kaminski and Guy Rub recognize a related issue when they discuss how
“[c]opyright faces a framing problem . . . . When courts adjudicate copyright disputes, they often
begin their analysis by deciding either to frame the copyrighted work as a whole or to focus on its
components or parts.” Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA
L. REV. 1102, 1104 (2017). They refer to the former as “zooming out” and the latter as “zooming in.”
Id. We think copyright law indeed has a framing problem, but it is multidimensional and not only
about zooming out or zooming in. As discussed in this section, copyright law’s framing problem is
about which particular aspects of a copyrighted work one decides to focus on and at which level of
generality one views a work. And this problem derives from copyright law’s lack of a claiming
methodology. For Kaminski and Rub’s quite different take on how copyright law’s framing problem
affects useful articles, see id. at 1128-41.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 178–82.
223 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 748.
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The work’s characteristics and its periphery are generally not further specified
until and unless there is a copyright dispute. The timing of copyright claiming
therefore tends to be late, and claims can be strategically crafted to fit the
contours of particular disputes. That is true even if the copyright holder
chooses to register the work prior to and independently of the dispute; unlike
design patent and trademark, registration does not require any meaningful
identification of the claimed aspects of the work. Because there is little to no
reflection on claiming in copyright law, the level of generality and the
medium of specification can vary, typically at the claimant’s choosing and
without much pushback or legal reflection.
*
*
*
If nothing else, this Part’s tour of the claiming rules in design patent,
trademark, and copyright—the three primary intellectual property systems
that protect design—shows how varied the claiming regimes are. Although
they all employ central, rather than peripheral, claiming, the claiming regimes
vary along other important dimensions, especially:
•
whether claiming is by exemplar or by characteristic;
•
the timing of the claims and their independence from particular
disputes;
•
the form of the claims (visual or verbal); and
•
the level of generality at which claims can be made.
In the next Part, we begin analyzing the consequences of choices along
these dimensions for a system for claiming design.
II. INTERNAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLAIMING DESIGN
The choice of claiming system for each design protection regime has
important internal consequences. That is, a design protection regime’s
adoption of central or peripheral claiming; exemplar or characteristic
claiming; early or late claiming; visual or verbal claiming; and more or less
abstract claiming have significant effects on the operation of that regime. The
most important effects relate to the background information the claimant can
use to structure its claim at the time that claim is made (and the related ability
to frame litigation); the extent to which a regime’s claim format is elastic or
manifold (which can lead to inconsistent or patchwork claiming); the
adequacy of notice; the difficulty of fixing claim scope; and the degree to
which claimants must internalize claiming choices with regard to both
validity and scope. Because the various dimensions we discussed above
influence each regime in these respects, we organize the following sections in
terms of the effects of claiming choices, highlighting relevant claiming
dimensions along the way. In light of this analysis, we suggest ways in which
each claiming regime might be optimized.
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A. Claim Timing and Information Available to Shape the Claim
At the outset, it is important to note that there are two critical timing
issues with regard to claiming design. First is the timing of claiming vis-à-vis
commercialization of the claimant’s design. Second is the timing with regard
to a particular assertion of rights. Claiming can happen early with regard to
both commercialization and rights assertion, late with regard to both, or late
with regard to commercialization but early with regard to assertion.
With this framing of timing variables in claiming design, consider how
the background information available at that moment in time can shape the
claim itself. Given the incentives design patent law creates, designers are
likely to file their applications early in their own commercialization timeline,
and possibly early with respect to potential competitors, depending on how
crowded the competitive landscape is at the time of the application.224 Even
if the market in which the applicant’s design will compete is crowded, neither
a potential competitor nor the applicant is likely to know at the time of
application how any competitor’s design will compete with the applicant’s
new design. Still, a smart, forward-looking applicant would devote time and
resources to understanding the competitive landscape and the ways others
might respond to the applicant’s design in order to make informed claiming
choices. This thoughtful applicant would also think about how it expects to
market the new design. Of course, no applicant can foresee every competitive
development during the design patent term. But any thoughtful applicant
realizes it is helpful to think about the future before making a design patent
claim in order to maximize design patent scope vis-à-vis competitors’ designs.
The incentive early claiming gives to an applicant—to consider how it will
market its design and how competitors might respond—is a feature, not a bug.
Consider the comparative case of utility patent law’s disclosure and utility
doctrines, which force inventors who file their patent applications early in the
development process to consider whether they can enable the scope of their
claims and whether their inventions have specific and substantial utility.225
224 That said, savvy design patent applicants can use patent continuations to secure protection
on certain variations of an earlier protected design, perhaps finding a way to secure protection for
competitors’ later-issued designs. See Burstein, Patented Design, supra note 67, at 221 (noting that
“design patent practitioners can use the PTO’s continuation procedures to ‘evergreen’ design patent
protection for a particular product for thirty or even forty years”); Perry J. Saidman, The Crisis in
the Law of Designs, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 301, 319-22 (2007) [hereinafter Saidman,
Crisis] (discussing an example of such practice for a lever-operated corkscrew).
225 The enablement requirement puts the onus on the applicant to disclose the invention in a
way that “teach[es] those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed
invention without undue experimentation.” Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501
F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The disclosure must also describe the invention in sufficient terms
such that one skilled in the art would conclude that the inventor actually possessed the claimed
invention at the time of filing. See, e.g., Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306,
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Inventors that can satisfy those criteria will have to disclose the information
demonstrating so; if they cannot satisfy the criteria, they will go back to the
drawing board and refine their inventions, thereby advancing their inventions
to society’s benefit.226 Analogously, requiring early claiming of designs should
force businesses to think through their designs and how they intend to
commercialize and market those designs. Early claiming gives designers an
incentive to articulate claims that correspond to their market intentions, which
they might not otherwise have thought through as thoroughly at that stage.
Two important features of current design patent law might, however,
prevent that desirable outcome by giving designers the incentive to claim
their designs broadly and in as piecemeal a manner as possible. First,
designers can claim their designs broadly without fear they will be denied a
design patent on novelty or nonobviousness grounds because those
protectability thresholds are enforced laxly, if at all.227 And second, because
design patent allows such extreme partial claiming, designers can fragment
their designs into multiple design patent applications and thereby achieve far
broader protection than they could receive if they were required to claim the
design of an article as a whole.228 To the extent modern design patent doctrine
provides these incentives to claim broadly, we think it dilutes the important
potential benefits of early claiming.
Designers who do claim in ways that anticipate their marketing are likely
to do a better job of providing notice to the public of both the design right
and the way the rightsholder might envision using the design in the
marketplace, something we discuss below.229 In terms of notice, then, it is
important that the law hold a claimant to the limits of claims that express

1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The utility requirement demands that the invention offer a “specific
benefit” in its “currently available form.” Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
226 The Supreme Court has explained that the disclosure requirement “stimulate[s] ideas and
the eventual development of further significant advances in the art.” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). As one of us has described, “patent disclosure indirectly stimulates
future innovation by revealing the invention’s design so that others can use it fruitfully when the
patent term expires and design around, improve upon, or be inspired by the invention, even during
the patent term.” Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 (2009) [hereinafter
Fromer, Patent Disclosure]; accord Fromer, Dynamic Disclosure, supra note 58, at 1716-19 (describing the
“multiple ways” in which effective patent disclosure should “stimulate further innovation”).
227 See McKenna & Strandburg, Progress, supra note 6, at 38-42.
228 See Burstein, “Article of Manufacture” Today, supra note 32, at 787-88 (“Partial claiming allows
a design patent owner to succeed on an infringement claim where the defendant’s product,
considered as a whole, doesn’t look the same as the patent owner’s product.”).
229 Infra Section II.C.
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those intentions, whether or not the designer’s eventual use of the design in
the marketplace matches its initial intentions.230
That said, it cannot be emphasized enough that the legal incentives to claim
early might be sufficiently strong that even sophisticated claimants will sometimes
(perhaps even often) be unable to claim in a way that encompasses the full range
of potential competitive designs. At the time at which designers must make their
claims, they may lack sufficient information about potential competitor responses.
And of course competitor behavior is a moving target because competitors will
often attempt to circumvent existing claims to intellectual property once those
claims are known to them. Take, for example, Two Pesos using the color blue for
the exterior of its restaurant, possibly to avoid the pink color it likely perceived to
be a critical limit on Taco Cabana’s rights in the design of its restaurants.231 In the
design patent realm, consider how the makers of the Insta-Pull lever-operated
corkscrew, depicted on the right in Figure 18, may have designed their product to
distinguish it from the Rabbit lever-operated corkscrew claimed in the design
patent drawing shown on the left.

230 Of course, because design patent claims are central, rather than peripheral, early claims will
not strictly limit a claimant to its early predictions about the competitive landscape. But the initial
claim does clearly form the core, anchoring claim scope. Supra Section I.A.
231 Supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text. Design patent applicants can frustrate that timing
by filing design patent applications as divisional applications from parent patent applications, which
might have been pending for a longer time. Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 59, at 115-16
(explaining the “keep [one] in the oven” strategy, by which design patent applicants can “go back to
the PTO and capture competing products that were introduced after the first design patent
application was filed—even if those competing products did not infringe the original patent claim”
(internal quotations omitted)); Saidman, Crisis, supra note 224, at 319-21 (describing an example of
such a continuation application strategy involving lever-operated corkscrews). When they do that,
they might be delaying claiming until the design is more complete and potentially commercialized.
That sort of delay might also give the design patent owner more opportunity to consider what
competitors are doing and to claim strategically in relation to those competitors.
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Figure 18: Rabbit232 (Left) and Insta-Pull233 (Right) Lever-Operated
Corkscrews

When the Rabbit corkscrew’s maker discovered this competitor, it filed
for—and secured—broader design patents, depicted in Figure 19, as
continuations of its issued design patent, with the apparent aim of rendering
the Insta-Pull’s otherwise different design infringing.
Figure 19: Design Patent Continuations234

232 U.S. Patent No. D446,098 fig.1.
233 Happy Easter, THE WEEKLY SCREW: THE VIRTUAL CORKSCREW MUSEUM’S WEEKLY
NEWSPAPER (Apr. 16, 2006), http://www.bullworks.net/daily/weekly003.htm [https://perma.cc/

E7XD-MBYW].
234 U.S. Patent No. D442,045 fig.1; U.S. Patent No. D441,265 fig.1.
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Indeed, after being granted these two new design patents, the
Rabbit’s maker filed suit against the Insta-Pull maker, though the court
refused to find infringement.235
The encouragement that an early claiming regime provides for parties to
commit to a particular commercialization or marketing strategy can have
other downsides. Early claiming makes it more difficult for businesses to
defer commercialization or marketing commitments until they better
understand how consumers will react to their design. And one could imagine
that claims would, in some circumstances, be clearer if they were drawn with
better information about the sorts of competitive designs one intended to
encompass. Early claiming may lead to more partial or fragmented claiming
as a way to hedge against narrow rights that could otherwise result from a
failure to anticipate consumers’ and competitors’ responses to a protected
design. Take the example of Aquazzura’s Christy shoe design. Not only has
that design been a commercial success, but it seems to have awakened in
consumers an interest in certain alternative laced designs, like Ivanka
Trump’s. Perhaps Aquazzura’s design patent rights would have been
construed to encompass Trump’s design; perhaps they would not. But the
scope of Aquazurra’s claim likely would have been clearer if it had known how
this design might later be understood in the marketplace.
Trademark claiming differs from design patent claiming in terms of
timing and the availability of information about consumer understanding and
competitor behavior. Recall that trademark owners can choose whether to
register their designs.236 Other than the general advantages of earlier
registration, there is comparatively less pressure to register trademarks early

235 Metrokane, Inc. v. Wine Enthusiast, 185 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Interestingly, the court took disapproving notice of the plaintiff ’s strategic continuation filings:

It is quite revealing that plaintiff filed the applications for the two patents in suit only
after plaintiff had seen defendant’s accused device on the market and had acquired a
specimen of it and, indeed, only a few days before the original Complaint in this action
was filed. Plaintiff obviously scrutinized defendant’s device for any points of visual
similarity to its own commercial device, and focused the patent drawings on these
narrow features, however inconsequential and little noticed they had been before. The
design patent laws were established to encourage the decorative arts by providing
temporally limited protection for meritorious ornamental designs. They were not
intended to empower patent owners to harass competitors who are marketing devices
which happen to incorporate parts whose shapes resemble insignificant physical details
of the patent owner’s products. This is apparently the game of “gotcha” which plaintiff
is attempting to play in this case.
Id. at 327-28 (citation omitted).
236 Supra Section I.B.
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than there is to apply for a design patent because trademark rights arise out
of the use of a protectable mark rather than out of registration.237
We suspect that, even when parties seek to register their trade dress before
litigation, they still apply well after they have commercialized the trade dress,
and that the delay in seeking registration relative to commercialization is more
pronounced for trade dress than it is for other types of marks. Use-based
applications must be based on preexisting use, which means registered designs
necessarily have been commercialized to some extent before application.
Product designs in particular should have been in relatively widespread use,
typically for some time, before the date of application because product design
cannot be registered unless and until the design has acquired secondary
meaning.238 Those registration timing rules probably correspond to designer
motivations, as we doubt that many businesses develop product design for the
purpose of designating source but instead seek to protect certain design
aspects as trade dress when they later come to serve that purpose for
consumers (or, more cynically, when other legal options are unavailable).239
Converse’s suit against Wal-Mart and New Balance is instructive. In that
case, Converse alleged that the defendants infringed Converse’s trademark
rights in the design of its Chuck Taylor athletic shoes, which it claimed
consisted of the features shown in Figure 20.240

237 Priority is also determined by use, subject to constructive-use provisions relating to
intent-to-use applications. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(b), 1057(c) (2012). Because determining the nature
and amount of use necessary to establish priority can be difficult, there is some incentive to apply
to register on the basis of an intent to use a mark, which would set one’s priority date in relation
to the filing date. But product design is protectable only with evidence of secondary meaning.
See supra text accompanying note 236. Therefore, parties cannot apply to register design on the
basis of an intent to use it. Thus, priority for purposes of product design is entirely determined
by use. There are obviously advantages to registration in terms of the geographic scope of rights.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (specifying that filing an application to register a mark confers a
“nationwide” right of priority).
238 Supra Section I.B.
239 Cf. David H. B. Bednall et al., Color, Champagne, and Trademark Secondary Meaning
Surveys: Devilish Detail, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 967, 971 (2012) (“Once they have established a
brand, companies seek to build and then protect their brand equity.”); Steffen Herm & Jana Möller,
Brand Identification by Product Design: The Impact of Evaluation Mode and Familiarity, PSYCHOL. &
MARKETING 1084, 1084 (2014) (“Once companies have established strong associations between
product designs and brands in consumers’ minds, they seek protection against imitation as well as
consistency in product lines.”). Here there is likely some contrast with product packaging, which
we suspect businesses tend to register earlier in relation to commercialization than they do product
configuration because those businesses are more likely to be focusing on legal protection when
they create that packaging. And that would make sense because product packaging is capable of
being considered inherently distinctive and is therefore potentially protectable immediately upon
use. Supra Section I.B.
240 Complaint at 4, In re Certain Footwear Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-936, (USITC June 23, 2016),
available at http://www.itcblog.com/images/conversecomplaintpart1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9LA-BUBB].
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Figure 20: Converse Trade Dress Claim241

As Wal-Mart and New Balance emphasized in their arguments to the
Federal Circuit, Converse claimed the shoe design as trade dress only after
many years of use, during which it had emphasized not the design elements,
but the Converse brand and All Star logo.242
Such post-use claiming sets up a different dynamic than does earlier
design patent claiming. Those who claim trade dress rights after a long period
of use have the opportunity to gauge competitors’ reactions and to see how
consumers understand the design in the marketplace before asserting a claim.
These pieces of information give trademark claimants the opportunity to
define their claims so as to sweep both consumer understanding and
competitor designs within the claim boundaries.
Parties that assert rights in unregistered trade dress can delay claiming even
further because they do not have to identify the elements of their trade dress
until they decide to enforce rights in their designs.243 Those parties can shape
their claims to encompass the particular uses they allege infringe their rights.
Copyright is similar to trademark in the sense that registration is optional.
Copyright vests as soon as an original work of authorship is fixed in a tangible
medium. As in trademark, there are some advantages to registering a
copyright; most obviously, one cannot sue to enforce a copyright unless and
until it is registered.244 Even though the copyrighted work serves as the
exemplar in a central claim to the work, copyright owners refine their claims
only in the course of litigation.
There are two primary benefits of recognizing unregistered rights. The
first, and most obvious, is the low cost of rights acquisition. Second, and
related, is the ability to defer judgment about which rights to pursue until it

241 Corrected Non-Confidential Principal Brief of Intervenors at 7, Converse, Inc. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, No. 2016-2497, 2017 WL 2870241 (Fed. Cir. June 26, 2017).
242 Id. at 9-14.
243 Supra Section I.B.
244 Supra Section I.C.
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is clear which marks or works are commercially valuable. Trademarks and
copyrighted works both may have limited commercial life, and so they may
not be worth the time and expense of registration. In fact, we suspect that
design will often have an especially limited commercial life, relative to
paradigmatic trademark and copyright subject matter (word marks and logos,
for trademark; books and songs, for copyright). Designers’ ability to delay
claiming therefore permits them to capture unscrupulous behavior as it is
happening in the market without wasting resources registering designs that
aren’t worth the expenditures.
That said, there are real costs to late claiming. As the Taco Cabana, Lisa
Frank, and Varsity Brands examples all demonstrate, allowing parties to delay
claiming until litigation enables them to define their claims strategically so as
to encompass alleged infringers’ behavior, something that would be more
difficult if they were forced to claim rights earlier and independently of a
particular dispute. Delayed claiming also diminishes the adequacy of notice,
as we discuss below.245
With this analysis of claim timing and the background information
available to shape the claims at the moment of claiming, we turn now to the
extent to which a regime’s claim format is elastic or manifold, which can lead
to inconsistent or patchwork claiming within a single regime.
B. The Elasticity and Multiplicity of Claim Formats
As our discussion above indicates, claim format is elastic—and often
multiple—within any one design protection regime. Elasticity and
multiplicity emerge out of a regime’s claiming features: central claiming;
allowance of multiple, different claims over time; and intermingling of visual
and verbal claims. In this section, we analyze the possibility that inconsistent
or patchwork claims might emerge for a single design within a single regime.
Later, in sections C and D, respectively, we take up the related consequences
for the adequacy of notice and claim scope.
1. Central Claiming, by Exemplar and Characteristic
As we have noted, the three intellectual property regimes that can protect
designs—design patent, trademark, and copyright—are best characterized as
utilizing forms of central claiming. They use central claiming because
claimants in these legal regimes identify some—but not all—members of the
set of designs protected by the right. Designs not specifically claimed might
still be protected by these regimes by virtue of infringement rules that permit

245

Infra Section II.C.
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non-identical designs to be considered within the scope of the claimant’s
rights. That stands in contrast to systems of peripheral claiming, which
require identification of all members of a given set.246
Before any litigation, the central claims in all three areas are principally
made by exemplar because the claims identify a particular member or
members of the set of protected designs rather than describing characteristics
shared by these members.247 In design patent, the exemplar is, unsurprisingly,
the design depicted in the drawing; in trademark law, it is the trade dress
being used in the marketplace (whether or not the trade dress is registered);
and in copyright law, the exemplar is the work that has been fixed.248 Third
parties are then left to adduce the scope of the claim from the claimed
exemplar and to determine whether their designs have enough characteristics
in common with the exemplar to be covered by the protected design right. If
litigation occurs, these systems of claiming by exemplar are supplemented, to
differing extents depending on the legal regime, by claiming by characteristic.
That is, rightsholders and courts describe the prototypical—if not the
essential—characteristics of the design in the course of litigation.
This particular combination of claiming regimes—central and by
exemplar before litigation and then also by characteristic once litigated—has
important implications. A system of central claiming by its nature creates the
possibility of multiple claims that may be at different levels of generality or
even inconsistent with each other. Central claiming enables this multiplicity
of claims because no single claim is thought to capture the periphery of the
creation, but rather identifies a prototype or central aspects of the creation.249
Other variations thus might be encompassed within the creation’s scope
whether or not they fall within the central claim’s bounds.
For that reason, central claims at varying levels of generality or even
inconsistent claims are not necessarily nonsensical.250 Multiple central claims
might each focus attention on the salient aspects of a creation based on the
context in which each claim is made. In that sense, it is much like the way we
understand many concepts like a “game.” We might reasonably make a central
Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 105, at 1745, 1749; Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 724-30.
Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 724-30.
The exception to prelitigation claiming by exemplar is the registered trademark, which
comprises some claiming by characteristic in the registration’s verbal description. Supra Section I.B.
249 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 726-27.
250 In one limited circumstance, inconsistent claims might be disallowed. Pursuant to the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, design patent law disallows the reclaiming of material
that was disclaimed or narrowed during prosecution of a claim. Pac. Coast Marine Windshields
Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 700-02 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-731 (2002) (holding that prosecution history
estoppel promotes clarity and that “[t]his clarity is essential to promote progress, because it enables
efficient investment in innovation”).
246
247
248
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claim for a “game” that focuses on rules, competitive play according to those
rules, and a winner of the competition. But we can also have central claims
for a “game” that, instead or additionally, focuses on cooperative play—
thinking of games like Pandemic251—or on the absence of victory conditions—
thinking of games like The Ungame.252 Or we can have a central claim that
demands that a “game” depends on skill—as in chess253—and another that
says, seemingly in opposition, that a “game” depends on luck—as in Candy
Land.254 All of these can reasonably be central claims, made alone or together,
for a “game.” On this view, the potential multiplicity of central claims is
essentially benign, or perhaps helpful in focusing attention on relevant
features, even if some of the claims seem incompatible.
On another understanding, multiplicity is worrisome in that a claimant
can strategically multiply claims that are inconsistent or that vary in
generality and thereby undermine clarity. As just one example, consider
again the very detailed claim Varsity Brands submitted to the Copyright
Office when it sought registration of its cheerleading uniform design.255 As
discussed above, Varsity Brands likely crafted that claim to convince a
skeptical Copyright Office that it deserved at least narrow protection on a
possibly unoriginal useful article.256 Yet when Varsity Brands sued Star
Athletica for infringing its uniform designs, it claimed copyright in those
designs at a much more abstract and encompassing level, describing the
designs as consisting of “the lines, stripes, coloring, angles, V’s, and shapes
and the arrangement and placement of those elements.”257 Each of those
claims, read in isolation, gives a very different sense of the scope of Varsity
Brands’ copyrights. Anyone who read both claims together would surely be
befuddled as to what those copyrights cover.
2. Claim Timing
Not only does claim timing vary across the different design protection
regimes, as we discussed in the previous section,258 but each separate regime

251 Pandemic, BOARDGAMEGEEK, https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/30549/pandemic
[https://perma.cc/LY95-GY8W] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
252 The Ungame, BOARDGAMEGEEK, https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/6283/ungame
[https://perma.cc/J4H4-7FN3] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
253 Chess, BOARDGAMEGEEK, https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/171/chess [https://perma.cc/
CK2R-HYUY] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
254 Candy Land, BOARDGAMEGEEK, https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/5048/candyland [https://perma.cc/6N4S-JAZH] (last visited Feb. Sept. 30, 2018).
255 Supra text accompanying note 201.
256 Supra text accompanying notes 202–03.
257 Star Athletica Joint Appendix, supra note 197, at 242.
258 Supra Section II.A.
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often permits parties to claim at multiple times. Design patent claims are
formalized in the patent application, but they often are supplemented to some
extent by verbal descriptions of the design in litigation.259 Parties formulate their
trademark claims in applications to register their marks or in litigation.260 And
copyright claims can be made in applications to register and in litigation.261
When a single regime allows parties to claim at multiple points in time,
chances are good that the claim content will vary based on the background
information that is available and salient at the time of the claim. Claim
multiplicity, then, results not just from central claiming, but also from the fact that
all of the design protection regimes permit claiming at multiple points in time.
3. Visual and Verbal Claiming
Claims can also multiply within any one regime because parties combine
visual and verbal claims. Before describing the contribution of differing
modes of claiming to multiplicity, we first compare the three design
protection regimes in terms of the dominance of visual or verbal claiming.
We then analyze how visual claiming and verbal claiming of what otherwise
might seem like the same information might lead to different
understandings of that information.
Design patent, trademark, and copyright law vary in terms of the
dominant medium in which parties are expected to make their claims. In
design patent law, claiming is entirely visual, but in litigation the visual claims
are commonly supplemented to some extent by verbal description.262
Claiming is hybrid in the trademark registration context, in that a claim will
typically consist of a drawing, a verbal description of the mark depicted in
the drawing, and a classification of the goods or services for which the design
will be used.263 The verbal descriptions, however, are highly inconsistent,
even though they are required for designs. By contrast, unregistered trade
dress claimed for the first time in litigation must be verbally claimed, and
that verbal description supplements the visual trade dress actually being used
in the marketplace.264 Copyright claiming is most like claiming of
unregistered trade dress, in that parties claim principally in verbal form in
the context of infringement litigation, supplementing the exemplar claims
that are the works themselves.265
Supra Section I.A.
Supra Section I.B.
Supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.B. The form of the registration, however, tends not to control in
infringement litigation.
264 See supra Section I.B.
265 See supra Section I.C.
259
260
261
262
263
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These differences in claiming medium, even when claims appear to be
conveying the same information, can also yield distinctions in the
understanding of that information. As courts have emphasized with regard
to design patent claims, visual claims typically are thought to be perceived
more holistically than verbal claims, which are thought to be more readily
picked apart into their constituent pieces.266 To the extent these legal
characterizations accurately reflect human psychology—and evidence
indicates they generally do267—visual and verbal claims will effectively
convey the “same” information differently. For example, decisionmakers
asked to evaluate whether a particular accused product infringes a visually
claimed design are likely to compare the designs holistically, whereas those
asked to compare the accused product to a verbally claimed design might
compare the designs in a more piecemeal fashion to match corresponding
parts. A visual claim can thereby lead a decisionmaker to overlook
differences between designs that the same decisionmaker would regard as
pertinent were the claim verbal instead.
Amy Adler and Rebecca Tushnet have both written about courts’
interpretations of images, and particularly the differential legal treatment
that images receive, as compared to text, for the First Amendment and
copyright purposes.268 As Tushnet observes:
Copyright oscillates between two positions on nontextual creative works such
as images: they are either transparent, or they are opaque. When courts treat
images as transparent, they deny that interpretation is necessary, claiming
that images merely replicate reality, so that the meaning of an image is so
obvious that it admits of no serious debate.269

By contrast, Tushnet notes, “[w]hen [courts] treat images as opaque, they deny
that interpretation is possible because images are so far from being susceptible to
discussion and analysis using words that there is no point in trying.”270
Design patent jurisprudence reflects the simplified view of images, as
courts caution against describing claims verbally, suggesting that the images

See supra Section I.A.
Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 690-92 (“Images are more vivid and
engaging than mere words, decreasing our capacity to assess images critically because we are more
involved in reacting to them.”); accord NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON
DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 7 (2009)
(“With words, we can’t get the idea without getting to the end of the spoken or written thought.
With pictures . . . we can stop ‘reading’ when we think we recognize the subject matter . . . .”).
268 See Amy Adler, The First Amendment and the Second Commandment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 41,
42 (2013) [hereinafter Adler, First Amendment]; Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 687.
269 Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 686-87.
270 Id. at 687.
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speak for themselves or cannot be reduced to words.271 Yet, as Adler and
Tushnet each lay bare in their work, “[w]e are vulnerable to the treachery of
images” because they “appear to us to resemble unmediated reality more than
words do.”272 Because of our tendency to treat pictures as reality, we might be
prone to overlook the ways pictures can be cropped, expanded, or
manipulated to emphasize certain features over others.273 This is especially
worrisome because we process pictures holistically and quickly.274
At the same time, as the design patent cases reflect, courts and other legal
actors cannot help but resort to words, at the very least because they must
explain their reasoning.275 As Neal Feigenson and Christina Speisel observe:
Law, like most disciplines or practices that aspire to rationality, has tended to
identify that rationality (and hence its virtue) with texts rather than pictures,
with reading words rather than “reading” pictures, to the point that it is often
thought that thinking in words is the only kind of thinking there is.276

But verbal description isn’t always neutral; indeed, forcing verbal
articulation can actually alter perception of objects or images, a phenomenon
referred to as “verbal overshadowing.”277

See supra Section I.A.
Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted);
accord Adler, First Amendment, supra note 268, at 43; see FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 267, at
8-9; WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, THE RECONFIGURED EYE: VISUAL TRUTH IN THE POSTPHOTOGRAPHIC ERA 24 (1992).
273 Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 694, 726; see also FEIGENSON & SPIESEL,
supra note 267, at 9-10. As William Mitchell explains in analyzing photography, “[s]electing a station
point, framing the scene, and choosing the moment to expose are all intentional acts [by a
photographer].” MITCHELL, supra note 272, at 29; accord id. at 202 (“Traditionally, photographers
have tendentiously effaced and elided, when they wished to do so, through carefully selective framing
and cropping and through use of camera angles in which foreground objects occlude unwanted
background objects.”).
274 See FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 267, at 7; Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra
note 93, at 690-92.
275 Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 734; cf. Roland Barthes, The Photographic
Message, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 15, 18-19 (Stephen Heath ed. & trans., 1977) (“[T]o describe [a
photograph] is thus not simply to be imprecise or incomplete, it is to change structures, to signify
something different to what is shown.”). This can be so extreme that, as Jennifer Mnookin notes that
before the era of photography, “[i]n reports of patent cases, the reporters sometimes apologized for
the inclusion of drawings in their report.” Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic
Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 61 (1998).
276 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 267, at 4.
277 Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 93, at 734-35. Verbal overshadowing is
something that experts can resist but nonexperts cannot. Id. at 735-36.
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Perhaps, for example, Taco Cabana’s color-neutral verbal description of its
trade dress led the courts and jurors involved in that case to de-emphasize the
restaurants’ actual colors in adjudging similarity and consumer confusion.278
All of this amounts to a lot of confusion in our design protection regimes.
Visual exemplar claims—whether in design patents, trademark registrations,
or designs in the marketplace—are always supplemented in litigation by some
degree of verbal claiming. This verbal claiming can helpfully focus attention
on certain features, or it can distract from other pertinent features. Legal
actors need to be expressly conditioned to recognize the biases of images and
texts, which evidence shows can dislodge many of those biases.279
As we explore in the next section, the mixture of visual and verbal claims
can drive a wedge between the notice the public receives from an exemplar
claim pre-litigation and the verbal characterizations that flow later in
litigation. Variation in claim form is also connected to claim scope, given the
different ways in which images depicting a design and words describing the
“same” design communicate to an audience.280
*
*
*
This Section demonstrates that each of the three design protection
regimes comprises a system of central claiming that allows claiming at
multiple points in time and mixes visual and verbal claiming, though to
varying degrees. As a result, claimants can assert different, perhaps
conflicting, claims for the same design even within a particular protection
regime. This has further important consequences for adequacy of notice and
claim scope, to which we turn respectively in the next two Sections.
C. Adequacy of Notice
The primary purpose of intellectual property claims is, as one of us has
written, “to give notice to the public of the extent of the set of protected
embodiments so as to encourage efficient investment in innovation, thereby
fostering [the] law’s overarching goal of stimulating” creation.281 Yet the
adequacy of the notice provided by the design claims in any one legal regime
is affected by several claiming features.
As we discussed above, four features in particular create the potential for
a multiplicity of claims282: central claiming, often by exemplar rather than by
278 See id. at 737 (“[I]n [a copyright] infringement case, the ways in which the witnesses and
lawyers talk about the works at issue and direct factfinders’ attention to specific features will quite
literally change how the factfinders see the works.”).
279 Id. at 738 n.249.
280 See infra Section II.D.
281 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 721; accord Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 226, at 544-54.
282 See supra Section II.B.
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characteristic; the timing of claiming; the level of generality at which claims
can be made; and the extent to which there is a choice between verbal and
visual claiming. These features also affect notice, and we analyze each in turn.
We then discuss how clearer distinctions between claimed, unclaimed, and
disclaimed design features would help improve notice.
The potential multiplicity of claims within any of the design protection
regimes can, at least as currently implemented, undermine the adequacy of
notice as to the scope of protection. If reconfigured, however, the multiplicity
of claims could instead improve the adequacy of notice.
Poor notice is primarily a result of parties’ inability to assess which claims
take priority over other possibly conflicting claims. When more than one
claim is made to a protected design, one of those claims might seem to cover
a particular design while others might not. For example, claims might be
made at multiple points in time. The earlier claim might specify a color for a
restaurant exterior, and the later claim might not. Alternatively, multiple
central claims might be made, irrespective of time: perhaps one to the design
of a game requiring just skill and another to designs of games that require
only luck. Or a central claim by exemplar, rendered visually, might be
supplemented by a central claim by characteristic, made verbally: an image of
a mostly pink restaurant exterior supplemented by a verbal description of a
restaurant that doesn’t mention color at all, or that refers to “festive colors”
but does not specify pink. Or one can imagine multiple claims presented at
varying levels of generality—one with the excruciating detail of Varsity
Brands’ description to the Copyright Office and another with a more general
description referring only to lines, zigzags, and colorblocking.
These multiple claims are problematic in that a third party’s design could
seem to fall within the scope of one claim but not the others. Does the
corresponding design right cover anything that falls within the scope of any
of the multiple claims made to it, as in utility patent law?283 Does a
later/earlier/broader/narrower/verbal/visual claim instead take precedence?284
Or is the relation between multiple claims yet more complicated than that?
Without a framework to address these questions, the fundamental notice
function of intellectual property claims285 is severely undermined.
Some of the design protection regimes provide partial answers regarding
priority among multiple claims. Design patent doctrine makes clear that the
E.g., Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 731-41.
Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) (“The classic
judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to make sense in
combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the
implications of a later statute. . . . [A] specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should
control our construction of the [earlier] statute . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
285 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 761-67.
283
284
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visual design patent claim takes precedence over any later verbal claims made
in litigation. But as we discussed above, despite the formal emphasis on the
visual, courts dealing with virtually every validity or infringement question
inevitably engage in verbal description.286 Trademark doctrine prioritizes the
context in which the trade dress is used in the marketplace, even over the
form of any (optional) registration.287 Copyright law provides no guidance
whatsoever. None of the regimes gives anything close to a comprehensive
sense of how to resolve these conflicts. In fact, none of the regimes seems
even to recognize that the potential multiple claims can raise conflicts that
undermine the adequacy of notice. And courts’ inconsistencies in choosing
among claims, say with regard to level of generality, do not help matters. The
lack of methodology also undermines notice by making it difficult for courts
to be consistent in their interpretations.
The lack of methodology is a shame because, in our view, multiple claims
could, if implemented well, improve rather than impede notice. As one of us
has analyzed, multiple central claims to the same work can help third parties
understand the work’s scope by providing multiple vantage points from which
to construct that understanding.288 Relatedly, informational redundancies can
help communicate the salient features of a particular design through
“repetition of information [across multiple claims] so that it can be
reconstructed even [if single claims] cannot be retrieved or comprehended.”289
In fact, in spite of its apparent inefficiency, redundancy pervades human
communication, thereby aiding in comprehension.290
That design claims are central also affects the adequacy of notice. Despite
the widespread belief that peripheral claiming provides better notice of the
scope of rights, in some cases central claiming might instead provide better,
or at least equivalent, notice. Peripheral claims can be written with greater
ambiguity to make them broader. The Lisa Frank claim we discussed
previously,291 for example, might be seen as an attempted peripheral claim,

See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.B.
Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 761-67.
Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 226, at 573-79; accord John M. Golden, Redundancy:
When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 677-78 (2016) [hereinafter Golden, Redundancy]
(“[C]laim drafters are commonly engaged in an engineering exercise that deliberately introduces
redundancy . . . to try to protect against any of a number of ‘stresses’ or ‘failures’—invalidity
challenges, relatively narrow claim constructions, etc.—that can later afflict the language that they
use.”); cf. Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1105, 1157-61 (2003) (making comparable observations with regard to property claims).
290 See Fromer, Information Theory, supra note 49, at 85-91 (positing how copyright law can
be explained from the perspective of information theory and redundancy in communication);
Golden, Redundancy, supra note 289, at 658, 660-61.
291 Supra Section I.B.
286
287
288
289
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yet it was both long and abstract, perhaps undermining any notice value of
the claim. Additionally, because designing consists essentially of visual
drafting, a comprehensive set of visual peripheral claims is impracticable.292
Central claiming is therefore likely preferable to peripheral claiming for
design claims, not only because of peripheral claiming’s defects, but also
because central claiming has some distinct advantages. Pertinently, cognitive
science research suggests that central claims correspond better to categorical
learning.293 And sometimes a central claim made at a particular moment in
time can helpfully focus attention on features that are relevant to the
circumstances, or even the dispute, at hand.294
Still, notice can often be undermined by the fact of multiple central
claims, possibly made at different points in time, that appear to suggest
differing scopes.295 One thing that might ameliorate this concern to some
extent would be a requirement that a note accompany each formal design
claim specifying that the claim is not exhaustive—essentially putting third
parties on notice of potential multiplicity.
With regard to claiming by exemplar or by characteristic, in general “when
intellectual property law is protecting a small, poorly differentiated category,
claiming by exemplar would be appropriate. But claiming by characteristic would
be more suitable for larger, better differentiated categories, though claiming by
exemplar might also play a role in teaching categorical boundaries.”296
That said, context matters. Design is inherently visual, more so than many
other types of matter protected by intellectual property rights. It would
therefore be difficult to imagine a design claiming system that did not at least
include visuals. In any system that does not limit infringement to identical
reproduction of a design in every detail, it is difficult to conceive of visual
claims as claims by characteristic. Thus, it seems unlikely that notice would
be effective in the design context without exemplar claiming, even if claiming
by characteristic can be more helpful for notice generally. For this reason,
claiming by exemplar should be seen as a given in design protection regimes.
What can be optimized with regard to notice is the precise form of visual
exemplar claiming, and any supplementation of claiming by characteristic.
Identification of characteristics—even if within a system of central
claiming under which the listed characteristics are prototypical rather than
necessary or sufficient—helpfully supplements visual claiming by directing

See Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 728 tbl.1.
Id. at 761-65.
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of Louboutin’s claim, particularly its emphasis on the
contrasting red sole, comes to mind here. See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.
295 Supra subsection II.B.1.
296 Fromer, Claiming, supra note 26, at 766.
292
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parties to the more relevant characteristics in an exemplar. It might otherwise
be difficult to adduce which design characteristics are most important.
The mix of visual and verbal claiming affects notice in another way. As
discussed above, visual claims tend to be interpreted holistically, whereas
verbal claims instead focus attention—or distract attention away from—
particular features.297 Both claim formats can distort, standing alone. Courts
have often recognized that fact, which is why they sometimes emphasize the
visual—reflecting concern that parties will omit or unduly emphasize certain
design features—and sometimes prioritize the verbal—out of concern parties
will abstract away from the protectable features. But alternating emphasis
misses the opportunity to develop a more holistic claiming methodology that
would in all cases combine elements of visual and verbal claiming, perhaps at
least by requiring verbal disclaiming, to draw attention to features that are
not part of the claim.
Adequacy of notice is also a function of when third parties learn of a
design’s existence and when they learn that the designer claims rights in the
design. A third party might see a design in the marketplace but have little
reason to know that anyone claims rights in it, let alone which features are
claimed. Obviously, by the time any litigation starts, third parties will know
of both the design and the claim of rights. And when the design is
registered—as it must be for design patents and as it can be for trademarks
and copyright—the public is constructively on notice that the owner claims
some rights in the design. But for unregistered trademarks or copyrights,
third parties might have knowledge of the design but not of any particular
assertion of rights to it. Linking knowledge of the existence of a design to the
observation that the designer might assert rights in aspects of the design is
not always trivial, especially when the design is a composite, as is typical.298
At the time a design patent issues,299 the public is on notice of both the
design and a claim of rights. By that time, depending on the industry, there
is a reasonable chance the claimant’s design has been commercialized.300 In

Supra subsection II.B.3.
Supra text accompanying notes 135–37.
On average, design patents issue twenty months after filing. Supra text accompanying note 61.
This might be more likely to be true of, say, fashion designs as compared with computer
hardware designs, given differences in business cycles, although much depends on when design patent
applications are filed in that business cycle. See ELAINE CHEN, BRINGING A HARDWARE PRODUCT
TO MARKET: NAVIGATING THE WILD RIDE FROM CONCEPT TO MASS PRODUCTION 1-4 (2015)
(explaining that the business cycle of hardware products is “long and costly” as it can take years to
create commercialized products after the core technology is developed); Fast Fashion, FASHION LAW
(Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/learn/fast-fashions-green-initiatives-dont-believe-thehype [https://perma.cc/HXY3-64GX] (noting that fast-fashion retailers consistently deliver new
designs to their stores every four to six weeks).
297
298
299
300
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general, then, both claiming and public notice of a claim of rights in a design
happen relatively early for design patents.
But that is less true for trademark or copyright rights in design. When
the rights are unregistered, there is little or no public notice of the claims.
Notice is not significantly improved even when those rights are registered
because courts do not understand the claims within these registrations to bind
rightsholders in their assertion of rights.301
If notice were the only concern, the obvious solution here would be to require
early, binding claiming. But there are some good reasons to de-emphasize
registration in the trademark and copyright contexts. In particular, mandatory
registration raises the cost of protection for designers and can work as a trap for
the unwary, preventing designers from acquiring rights when they inadvertently
fail to register in a timely fashion.302 Moreover, because American trademark law
connects rights in a design to its use in the marketplace, early notice might not
always be possible because the rights depend on consumers’ association of the
design features with a particular source, and consumer understanding can change
as marketplace conditions evolve.303
One way to improve the quality of notice would be to make it easier for
third parties to distinguish between a design’s claimed, unclaimed, and
disclaimed aspects. For example, consider the broken lines that might be
found in a design patent claim. Matter depicted in broken lines is technically
unclaimed.304 Yet to the uninitiated, this matter might appear to be claimed
matter that narrows the scope of protection in the design.305 Or it might seem
to be disclaimed. We think it would be useful to have a third mode of
depiction for disclaimed matter, or at least a verbal supplement to disclaim
matter within a visual depiction. Verbal supplementation might be especially
effective here because verbal claiming by its nature tends to focus attention
on specific features—exactly as one would want disclaimers to do.
D. Claim Scope and Litigation Framing306
In addition to providing notice, claims are critical to framing virtually
every aspect of intellectual property litigation. Every infringement action
involves an allegation that the defendant has violated the plaintiff ’s rights in
the claimed design. As a result, the first thing a court must do is figure out
See supra Sections I.B–C.
Sprigman, supra note 184, at 491-93 (describing the high costs of compliance in early
American copyright law).
303 See supra Section I.B.
304 See supra Section I.A.
305 When assessing design patent scope, even someone familiar with design patent claiming
conventions might subconsciously, or mistakenly, include matter in broken lines.
306 Portions of this section are adapted from Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28.
301
302
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what the claimed design is. Only then can the court determine whether the
claimed property is subject to valid rights because all of the relevant validity
doctrines in design patent, trademark, and copyright assess the validity of
the design as claimed.
One significant part of the validity determination in every design
protection regime is a comparison of the claimed design with what came
before it. Almost all intellectual property regimes premise protection on
some form of novelty—the invention or creation of a new thing the world has
not seen before.307 But truly new creations are rare things. Almost all creators
add their contributions onto a base of prior knowledge. And, for various
policy reasons, intellectual property regimes refuse to protect some features,
no matter how different they might be from what preceded them. For
example, although they each understand functionality differently, none of the
three design protection regimes will protect functional features.
At the same time, all intellectual property regimes recognize that a party
can own some valid rights in a work even when many features of the work are
not protectable. One can, for example, get a utility patent on an invention
that incorporates many elements of prior inventions, as long as the newly
claimed invention adds some novel and nonobvious element.308 Utility patent
law refers to the features that make an invention patentable collectively as the
“point of novelty.”309 Design patent law also used to incorporate the concept
of the “point of novelty,” and although the Federal Circuit has since rejected
the terminology, it still evaluates a claimed design in light of prior art.
Copyright and trademark lack a similar term, but they have the same concept:
those features that are new and are not excluded from protection for policy
reasons can be the basis of protection for a work as a whole, but that which
was taken from the prior art or otherwise excluded from protection cannot be
protected separately. Thus, one important purpose of defining the relevant
307 Even trademark law, which does not require novelty per se, typically awards rights to the
party that first uses a mark in connection with particular goods or services. See supra Section I.B.
Copyright, of course, does not require novelty in the sense that the work must be different from
what came before it. Indeed, as a matter of blackletter doctrine, copyright attaches to any work
independently created (not copied from others) with a modicum of creativity. Supra Section I.C.
But that rule is more theoretical than true: some courts treat “striking similarity” between works as
strong evidence of copying. E.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1997) (“If,
therefore, two works are so similar as to make it highly probable that the later one is a copy of the
earlier one . . . .”). More importantly, the scope of copyright protection in a work that is identical to
other preexisting works would be vanishingly small. The plaintiff would have to prove that the
defendant’s work was copied from the plaintiff rather than from the preexisting work.
308 Cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-19 (2007) (“[A] patent composed of
several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was,
independently, known in the prior art.”).
309 See Lemley, Point of Novelty, supra note 87, at 1254-55 (discussing the role of the “point of
novelty” in patent law).
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design is to determine which features of the claimed design are protectable,
and whether valid rights attach in relation to a unit of the claimed scope.310
Once we know what the rightsholder has in fact contributed to the world,
we can ask what acts violate rights in that property. Every intellectual
property system determines infringement by reference to both the acts that
cannot be undertaken in relation to the subject of intellectual property rights
and the level of similarity between the defendant’s invention, work, or mark
and that of the plaintiff.311 Together, the prohibited acts and the requisite
similarity determine the legal scope of a party’s rights. That legal scope is
inextricably intertwined with the delineation of the entitlement, which is
inescapably anchored by the claims. When we, for example, say that the
defendant must publicly display “the copyrighted work,” we take for granted
that we have already been able to define “the copyrighted work” so that we
can connect our analysis of similarity to that work. Further, we generally
mean that the defendant must have taken the thing that gives the intellectual
property right its validity—the point of novelty, in patent terms. The marks
“Shake Shack” and “Joe’s Crab Shack” might share the word “shack,” but that
fact alone should not cause the newcomer to be guilty of trademark
infringement, for the simple reason that the word “shack” alone is not what
justifies protecting the trademark.
Determination of the scope of a party’s rights therefore necessarily
depends on a definition of the relevant intellectual property. More
particularly, evaluating whether the defendant’s use comes within the legal
scope of the plaintiff ’s rights requires identification of the protectable
elements of those rights. This is because all intellectual property regimes
require, at least in theory, not just similarity between the defendant’s and
plaintiff ’s works but similarity between the allegedly infringing work and the
protectable elements of the plaintiff ’s work.312 Infringement inquiries in
every area therefore depend in the first instance on the ability to determine
what a party has claimed. A court simply cannot run any of the relevant
doctrines except in relation to the claimed design. To the extent claiming
methodology interferes with clarity or enables parties to emphasize different
features at different times, the effects are pervasive and fundamental.
310 See Michael J. Madison, IP Things as Boundary Objects: The Case of Copyright Work, 6 LAWS
13, 13-14 (2017) (examining the ways that boundaries on protectable works may be “less distinct than
they appear”); Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 381, 397-98 (2005) (discussing the “broadening array” of potentially protectable things).
311 Fromer & Lemley, Audience, supra note 190, at 1251.
312 In addition, different information might be available in each design protection regime
to assess protectability, scope, and infringement. Pertinently, design patents list prior art
references. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2017). There is no comparable information for copyrights and
trademarks, even registered ones.
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E. Internalizing Validity and Scope
Intellectual property doctrines fall into three basic categories: validity,
infringement, and defenses.313 Each intellectual property regime tends to
separate doctrines into these three legal categories, often applying different
burdens of proof and asking different actors to decide issues in each
category.314 As a result of that separation, parties treat intellectual property
rights “like a nose of wax, which may be turned and twisted in any
direction.”315 When infringement is at issue, intellectual property owners
tout the breadth of their rights, while accused infringers seek to cabin them
within narrow bounds.316 When it comes to validity, however, the parties
reverse their positions: intellectual property owners emphasize the
narrowness of their rights to avoid having those rights held invalid, and
accused infringers argue the reverse.317 Courts often have difficulty
managing that strategic behavior and holding the scope of rights constant
for validity and infringement purposes.
Take, for example, Reynolds Consumer Products v. Handi-Foil Corp.318 In
that case, Reynolds objected to the packaging of a new line of Handi-Foil
aluminum-foil products.319 Reynolds claimed to own rights in the “overall
look, feel and commercial impression of its Reynolds Wrap packaging
design.”320 Specifically, Reynolds identified at least twelve elements that
make up this unregistered trade dress:
(a) the color scheme; (b) the use of the color scheme; (c) the use of
prominent lettering within the blue section; (d) the use of silver bands to
separate the blue and pink sections; (e) the placement of the quantity
information; (f) the inclusion of the “made in the U.S.A.” lettering; (g) the
repetition of the color scheme and type on the ends of the boxes; (h) the
“press here to lock” feature at the ends of the boxes; (i) the use of graphics
with how-to information; (j) the “Lift” graphic; (k) the positioning of the
313 See Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2219 (discussing the “separation between
validity, infringement, and defenses” in intellectual property cases).
314 Id. at 2220-23.
315 White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886).
316 See Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2225-66 (“IP owners will argue in the
infringement proceedings that their right is quite broad . . . only to turn around and argue in validity
proceedings that their right is quite narrow . . . . Accused infringers will do the reverse.”).
317 Id. In the German patent context, this phenomenon is referred as the “Angora cat” because
in infringement proceedings the patent resembles a blow-dried fluffy cat, and in invalidity
proceedings, the same cat looks like a little wet rolled-up bundle. Colleen Chien & Christian
Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent Reviews, STAN. TECH. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 16) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2601562).
318 No. 13-0214, 2014 WL 3615853 (E.D. Va. July 18, 2014).
319 See id. at *1.
320 Id. at *7.
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brand name on the top flap of the box; and (l) the color yellow, placement,
and text used to caution the consumer.321

In evaluating Reynolds’ claim, the court never addressed validity, let alone
identified the features that made the Reynolds trade dress protectable.322 It
simply engaged in a side-by-side comparison of Handi-Foil’s and Reynolds’s
packages, shown in Figure 21, which was enough for the court to conclude
that “the similarity between the overall impressions” was “striking.”323 What
were the damning similarities?
Figure 21: Reynolds and Handi-Foil Packages324

[T]he two boxes both say “non-stick” and “heavy duty.” The Reynolds box
says “foods lift right off!” and the Handi-Foil box says “Food Easily Lifts
Off!” Both boxes place the (identical) square footage on the right end of the
box, with the metric conversions typed neatly below. Additionally, the twodimensional images above cannot capture the similarity of the boxes’ side and
end panels, all of which bear striking semblance. Add to these characteristics
the “Made in USA” language on the right portion of the boxes . . . .325

These elements of similarity, and the court’s belief that Handi-Foil
attempted to mimic the Reynolds Wrap box to enter the aluminum-foil
market, convinced the court that the jury’s finding of trade dress
infringement was reasonable.326 In fact, according to the court, “any other
finding may well have been unreasonable.”327

321
322
323
324
325
326
327

Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Second Amended Complaint at 6, 9, Reynolds, No. 13-0214, 2014 WL 3615853.
Reynolds, 2014 WL 3615853, at *9.
See id. at *9-10 (“[T]he reasonableness of the jury’s trade dress verdict [has] become[] obvious.”).
Id. at *9.
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The problem with this conclusion is that the elements of similarity noted
by the court were not even elements of the trade dress articulated by
Reynolds, very likely because those elements almost certainly were not things
Reynolds was entitled to own. Phrases like “Food Easily Lifts Off ” and
“Made in the USA” are descriptive, so any rights Reynolds owned in relation
to the phrases must have been related to the particular stylization, which
Handi-Foil did not copy. When one limits the trade dress in the Reynolds
Wrap packaging to the sorts of things Reynolds is legally entitled to own, the
similarities disappear. Because, however, the court never definitively
determined the features of the claimed design, it could not hold the scope of
Reynolds’ rights constant across both validity and infringement analyses.
One of us previously attributed the “nose of wax” problem to the lack of
an integrated procedure for deciding the proper scope of a party’s rights.328
Yet the flexibility and multiplicity of claims, a particularly serious problem in
the context of design, enables inconsistency and makes it much more difficult
for courts to constrain the parties. That is how, for example, Varsity Brands
could claim its cheerleading uniform designs sufficiently narrowly to the
Copyright Office—to establish validity—and then later in litigation claim its
designs more broadly to capture Star Athletica’s designs.329 Yet a design ought
to be one and the same, whether validity or infringement is at issue.330
*
*
*
This Part shows that the choices each design protection system makes
regarding claiming methodology have significant consequences. Those choices
influence claim timing and the amount and content of information available
to shape the claim, the elasticity and multiplicity of claims, the adequacy of
notice provided by the claims, claim scope and litigation framing, and the
extent to which parties can strategically manage validity and scope. The
claiming methodologies adopted by each design protection regime give reason
for concern about the adequacy of notice because they all allow rightsholders
to claim strategically at different moments in time. These methodologies also
enable parties to avoid internalizing their claiming choices across validity and
scope inquiries, as intellectual property laws ought to do. To address these
concerns, design protection regimes should encourage earlier claiming where
plausible, construct a set of rules to decide how to prioritize between
conflicting claims, communicate clearly that central claims need not be
exhaustive so as not to mislead third parties, devise a standard to distinguish

Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2200-02.
Supra section I.C.
See Lemley & McKenna, Scope, supra note 28, at 2267 (“Our aim should be to find the proper
scope for an IP right. And that can’t be done if we consider validity, infringement, and defenses in
isolation.”).
328
329
330
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between claimed, unclaimed, and disclaimed matter, and emphasize the
constancy of claim scope across both validity and infringement analyses.
III. OVERLAPPING PROTECTION AND CLAIMING DESIGN
In this Part, we address the relationship between the varied claiming
systems in design patent, trademark, and copyright, along with the issue of
overlapping protection. After describing the way parties use these various
forms of protection cumulatively or as substitutes, we argue that overlapping
protection aggravates many of the concerns we described above about the
multiplicity of claiming methodologies, particularly by further weakening
notice. We then argue that the differences in claiming methodologies may in
some cases exacerbate the overlap problem, by enabling parties to game
limiting doctrines and by disguising the extent to which claims are really
directed to the same design.
A. Overlapping Protection for Design
What is worth emphasizing about Puma’s dispute with Forever 21 over
the bow slides is that Puma asserted design patent, trademark, and
copyright rights in the exact same design.331 That sort of claiming is far from
unique—parties often can, and frequently do, claim multiple forms of
protection for the exact same designs, or at least designs that consist in
substantial part of the same features. They use these different forms of
protection cumulatively or as substitutes for each other even though each
regime has a somewhat different purpose.
For a recent example of cumulative claiming, consider Spectrum Diversified
Design’s complaint against Target for infringing Spectrum’s rights in its Tovolo
Sphere Ice Molds, shown in Figure 22.

331

See supra text accompanying notes 4–5.
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Figure 22: Tovolo and Target Ice Molds332

According to Spectrum, Target’s Ice Mold infringes its design patent,
shown in Figure 23, and its trade dress in the design of the Sphere Ice
Molds.333 Spectrum described its trade dress as having a unique design that
corresponds to the shape depicted in its design patent, but also including “a
clear plastic mold base with two swirled-looking lines with the Tovolo®
trademark in the middle and a gray plastic mold top with grooves, lines,
ridges, and a wagon wheel design.”334
Figure 23: Claim in Spectrum’s Design Patent335

One important reason parties are often motivated to assert both design
patent and trademark claims has to do with potential remedies. Specifically,
parties cumulate claims in search of comprehensive remedies that neither
system readily provides on its own. A finding of design patent infringement
almost inevitably leads to an award of damages, which can be substantial, but
332 Complaint at 5, Spectrum Diversified Design, LLC v. Target Corp., No. 18-00133 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 29, 2018).
333 Id. at 5-6.
334 Id. at 4.
335 U.S. Patent No. D731,264 fig.1.
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it does not always result in an injunction.336 A finding of trademark
infringement, by contrast, usually leads to injunctive relief, but not always
damages.337 Parties therefore sometimes assert both design patent and
trademark claims so they can get the best of both worlds: damages on their
design patent claim and injunctive relief on their trademark claim.
For an example of substitutive claiming, consider Govino’s complaint against
GoVerre.338 In that case, Govino alleged that it owns several design patents
covering the design of a wine glass, but notably, Govino didn’t assert design
patent infringement, presumably because GoVerre’s glasses were not similar
enough to infringe the design patents.339 Instead, Govino alleged trade dress
infringement, arguing that its design patents prove the designs are ornamental.340
Govino’s claim against GoVerre also shows how parties’ cumulative or
substitutive use of these different regimes enables them to game the different
substantive rules in trademark, design patent, and copyright laws. In Govino’s
case, it attempted to avoid the relatively stricter design patent infringement
standard while benefitting from design patent’s relatively weaker
functionality doctrine, pointing to the design patents to establish trademark
nonfunctionality.341 To the extent claiming methodologies allow parties to use
these regimes cumulatively or as effective substitutes, the policy goals
underlying strong boundary-policing doctrines may be frustrated.

336 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006) (emphasizing that
injunctive relief for patent infringement should not be automatically granted); Mark A. Lemley, A
Rational System of Design Patent Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 219, 221-24 (2013) (setting out and
analyzing the generous damages provision for design patent infringement).
337 See Mark A. Lemley, Did eBay Irreparably Injure Trademark Law?, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1795, 1796 (2017) (“Trademark cases should take account of the true equities of trademark cases
. . . . Doing so will not mean that trademark owners always win injunctions, but it should make it
more common, at least in the core cases in which confusion is a real risk.”); Mark A. Thurmon,
Confusion Codified: Why Trademark Remedies Make No Sense, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 247-51 (2010)
(indicating that damages are not awarded as a matter of course following a finding of trademark
infringement); Rebecca Tushnet, What’s the Harm of Trademark Infringement, 49 AKRON L. REV. 627,
628 (2016) (arguing that courts should not always issue injunctions).
338 Complaint, Govino, LLC v. Goverre, Inc., No. 8:17-cv-01237 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2017).
339 Id. at 3.
340 Id. at 3, 12.
341 Trademark law polices functionality aggressively, denying trademark protection to features
whenever they are not arbitrary or fanciful vis-à-vis the article’s function (that is, when they
contribute to function in any meaningful degree). See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.,
532 U.S. 23, 29-30 (2001); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 990-92 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
rev’d on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016); Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l,
Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 503-09 (6th Cir. 2013). Design patent, by contrast, rarely disqualifies features
from protection on functionality grounds, doing so only when those features represent the only way
of achieving a functional result. Apple, 786 F.3d at 992.
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B. Exacerbating Notice Problems

Even if we only think about each of these areas of law protecting design in
isolation, the claiming issues we have described create significant notice and
scope problems. But it would be a mistake to consider them only in isolation
because it is so common for parties to assert multiple forms of rights for the
same design. As a result, would-be users, licensees, and courts have to evaluate
the scope of rights across multiple systems. That can be quite difficult. Even
when a party appears to claim rights in the same design and asserts its various
rights against the same allegedly infringing products, the design patent,
trademark, and copyright claims—not to mention the underlying substantive
laws—are not obviously identical.
In the well-known dispute between Apple and Samsung over the
iPhone, for example, Apple asserted both design patent and trade dress
rights.342 There was considerable overlap in terms of the Samsung devices
that Apple contended infringed its various rights. Apple’s claimed trade
dress seemed to be for the same Apple devices that Apple contended
embodied its patented designs. And the parties and the courts that
considered Apple’s claims treated them as if the overlap was essentially
complete. But compare Apple’s visual design patent claim with its different
verbal description of its unregistered trade dress.

Table 1: Apple Visual Design Patent Claim and Verbal Description of
Unregistered Trade Dress343
Design Patent

342
343

See Apple, 786 F.3d at 989-91.
Id. at 992, 997.

Unregistered Trade Dress
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a rectangular product with four
evenly rounded corners;
a flat, clear surface covering
the front of the product;
a display screen under the
clear surface;
substantial black borders
above and below the display
screen and narrower black
borders on either side of the
screen; and
when the device is on, a row
of small dots on the display
screen, a matrix of colorful square
icons with evenly rounded
corners within the display screen,
and an unchanging bottom dock
of colorful square icons with
evenly rounded corners set off
from the display’s other icons.

Deckers’ recent suit against H&M demonstrates even more clearly the
uncertainty created by different legal claims to a design.344 In that case,
Deckers alleged that H&M infringed a design patent covering various aspects
of the design of Deckers’ UGG boots, as shown in Figure 24.

Figure 24: Deckers’ Design Patents and Allegedly Infringing H&M
Boots345

344 Complaint at 1-2, Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., No. 17-00103
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017).
345 Id. at 4, 8.
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Deckers also claimed that H&M infringed its trade dress rights in the
Bailey Boot, which it described as follows:
•

Classic suede boot styling made famous by the UGG® Brand;

•

Overlapping of front and rear panels on the lateral side of the boot shaft;

•

Curved top edges on the overlapping panels;

•

Exposed fleece-type lining edging the overlapping panels and top
of the boot shaft; and

•

One or more buttons (depending on the height of the boot)
prominently featured on the lateral side of the boot shaft adjacent
the overlapping panels.346

Deckers contended that the same H&M boots infringed both the
design patent and the UGG trade dress.347 Indeed, it lined up its design
patent drawing, its Bailey Button boot, and H&M’s accused boot side by
side in its complaint, as shown in Figure 25.

346
347

Id. at 5.
Id. at 5, 8.
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Figure 25: Deckers’ Design Patent, Deckers’ Boot, and Allegedly Infringing
H&M Boot348

There are, however, some interesting and notable differences between the
design patent and trade dress claims. In some ways, the trade dress claim is
broader than the design patent, referring, for example, to “one or more buttons”
and leaving undefined the height of the boot.349 That is, the trade dress claim is
to a line of boots—boots with different numbers of buttons and of different
heights—and not to a particular boot design. The design patent by definition
claims a particular boot design. At the same time, the trade dress claim is also
conceivably narrower than the design patent in the sense that the trade dress
claim refers to a fleece-type lining, whereas the design patent clearly shows some
kind of lining but doesn’t identify a material.350 Because Deckers asserted both
design patent and trade dress rights against the same commercial products,
H&M had to layer the claims to determine the scope of Deckers’ rights. That
effect is common. Indeed, Target will have to do the same thing with regard to
Spectrum’s claims, which overlap substantially but not perfectly.351
C. Obscuring Overlap
Perhaps more subtly, the fact that a party’s claims to a particular design
might take different forms even when they are meant to cover the same
ground can obscure the extent of overlapping protection and perhaps lull
courts into a sense of complacency about the problems of overlap. The visual
claims in a design patent, for example, might focus courts on an overall
impression of the design, and that might happen even if the drawing uses
broken lines that technically limit the claim to particular features of the
design. Verbal descriptions of trade dress, by contrast, might direct courts to
specific features at the expense of overall impression.
348
349
350
351

Id. at 8.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
See supra notes 332–34 and accompanying text.
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These effects are likely most significant when the plaintiff has in fact
asserted multiple forms of rights. However, it’s also possible that the
persistence of different claim forms generally reduces courts’ sense that the
various rights overlap. That sort of effect may be a partial explanation for the
Seventh Circuit’s controversial decision in Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc.352 In that
case, Moen claimed only trade dress rights in the design of its faucets, and
Kohler defended in part by arguing that the court should not recognize trade
dress rights in product design because it is the subject matter of design patent
law.353 The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument,354 despite the Supreme
Court’s repeated expressions of concern about overlapping trademark and
patent rights, even in cases involving design patents.355
According to the Seventh Circuit, there was nothing to worry about.
Trademark rights are simply different from design patents because unlike
design patents, “trademark protection for a product’s configuration does not
create a monopoly in the use of the product’s shape.”356 Instead, the court
insisted that “Kohler [was] free to copy Moen’s design so long as it insure[d]
that the public [was] not thereby deceived or confused into believing that its
copy [was] a Moen faucet.”357
That distinction, as one of us has noted, was disingenuous, for the effect
of trade dress protection was to deny Kohler the ability to copy Moen’s design
for the purpose of competing with Moen in the market for faucets—in other
words, in the context most likely to have economic significance.358 That
Kohler was free to copy the design of Moen’s faucet as a sculpture hardly
establishes that trade dress rights work no competitive harm.
And precisely because Moen sought protection for the design of the faucet
itself—rather than the name attached to the faucet or its packaging—the
promise that Kohler was free to copy Moen’s design “so long as it insure[d]
that the public [was] not thereby deceived” was an empty one.359 The whole
point of seeking trade dress protection for product design features is to
enforce those rights against others who copy the product features specifically,
even when they do not copy word marks or packaging. Moen was not asking
the court simply to require Kohler to label its faucets effectively (Kohler had
already done that); it was asking the court to prevent Kohler from copying
12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 636-37.
Id. at 644.
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1964); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964).
356 Kohler, 12 F.3d at 640 n.10 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
357 Id.
358 McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, supra note 6, at 843-45.
359 Kohler, 12 F.3d at 640 n.10.
352
353
354
355
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the faucet’s design features because it contended that Kohler’s use of the same
design features for its faucets was what was likely to create the confusion.360
If Moen was right about that—if the confusion was caused by use of the
design features themselves—then it was impossible for Kohler to use the design
in a way that would ensure the public was not deceived.
We don’t suggest that differences in the form of design patent and
trademark claims completely explain Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc. or the other cases
that follow its reasoning. But it’s entirely possible that a design patent claim’s
inclusion of a faucet (even if some aspects were rendered in broken lines)
encouraged the court to think of design patent claims as in-gross claims that
differ from trade dress claims even when those claims are functionally
equivalent. Moreover, we suspect that it is generally harder for courts to see
the functional equivalence between these forms of protection because
claiming methodology differs across areas of intellectual property.
IV. FIXING CLAIMING VARIANCE
Having described the substantial problems that can result from the use of
such different—not to mention internally muddled361—claiming rules across
the various areas of design protection, we now consider possible ways of
addressing the relationship between claiming and overlapping protection.
Two potential approaches stand out. For those who are convinced that
overlapping rights are problematic—or that the claiming issues we describe
make that overlap intolerable—the solution is to eliminate the overlap, either
using doctrines of election or channeling doctrines. For those who are
comfortable with overlap among the design protection regimes, we suggest a
more targeted fix for claiming, namely the adoption of a transsubstantive
claiming regime for design. There are different costs and benefits to each
approach, which we consider in turn.
A. Eliminating Overlap
The most straightforward way to deal with the problems caused by the
diverse claiming regimes for design would be to eliminate overlapping
protection. If design claimants could avail themselves of only a single form of
360 Id. at 633 (recounting the evidence that Moen introduced, which demonstrated the
likelihood of source confusion).
361 Earlier in this Article, we address a number of improvements to each claiming regime to
restore internal order, including encouraging earlier claiming where plausible, constructing a set of
rules to decide how to prioritize between conflicting claims, communicating clearly that central
claims need not be exhaustive so as not to mislead third parties, devising a standard to distinguish
between claimed, unclaimed, and disclaimed matter, and holding the scope of a design right constant
across both validity and infringement analyses. Supra Part II.
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protection, claiming methodology could not differ across protection regimes
for the simple reason that only one claiming regime would govern. Although
one would surely want to optimize the governing claiming regime, the
mischief that derives from multiple design claiming systems would be avoided.
Concerns about overlapping forms of protection typically are premised on
the notion that a party’s ability to claim multiple forms of protection
undermines the inherent, but different, bargains on which each form of
protection is based.362 Whereas design patent law exists to encourage industrial
design, trademark law fosters competition by preventing deceptive use of
source indicators and copyright law aims to stimulate the creation and
dissemination of works of authorship. Yet all three forms of protection are
increasingly available for design.363 Despite significant doctrine reflecting
concern about overlapping protection for functional features, modern courts
and some commentators are more sanguine about overlapping forms of design
protection. They reason that, so long as each area of law provides for protection
on its own terms, creators should not have to choose among those rights.364
We do not wade further here into the debate on the propriety of
overlapping regimes. Instead, we describe two principal tools courts have
used to manage overlap, to the extent it is a problem: doctrines of election
and channeling doctrines. We discuss the benefits of each approach in turn.
1. Doctrine of Election
In the early twentieth century, courts routinely held that creators of works
could elect just one form of intellectual property protection, even if they would
seem to qualify for multiple forms.365 For example, in 1910, a circuit court ruled
that even when a work—there, a watercolor painting of sprigs of holly,
mistletoe, and spruce intended for use as wrapping paper—was potentially
protectable under design patent or copyright, “the author or owner [must]
decide[] under which statute he would protect his property.”366 The court
reasoned that “[t]he method of procedure, the term of protection, and the
penalties for infringement, are so different that the author . . . of a painting
that is eligible for both classes must decide to which region of intellectual
effort the work is to be assigned, and he must abide by the decision.”367
See supra note 7.
E.g., Heymann, Overlapping, supra note 7, at 242-46 (discussing how the boundaries between
the different doctrines have developed over the years).
364 See id. at 252-56 (“[A]lthough it was not the focus of the opinion, the Supreme Court lent its
voice in 2000 to the chorus of courts finding no doctrinal issue with simultaneous intellectual property
rights.” (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 205-08 (2000))).
365 Id.
366 Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150, 151 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1910).
367 Id. at 152.
362
363
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During this period, courts similarly ruled that a designer had to elect
between design patent and trademark protection, reasoning that allowing
both forms of protection for the design “would result for all practical purposes
in an extension of the design monopoly.”368 More recently, however, courts
have rejected election, allowing qualifying creators to hold and enforce
multiple forms of intellectual property with regard to the same creation.369
One solution to the issues raised by design claiming would be to revitalize
the doctrine of election for designs. Requiring a designer to choose only one
of design patent, trademark, and copyright would ensure that the designer is
thereby also choosing just one claiming regime, which would eliminate the
notice problems attributable to varied claiming methodologies, and it would
reduce the opportunity for strategic behavior.370
A number of considerations affect the viability and value of a doctrine of
election, particularly the timing and form of election, creator choice, and the
subject of election. Consider first the timing and form of election. For
election to simplify the claiming rules, parties must not initially be able to
claim multiple forms of protection and only later be forced to decide which
of the three forms of protection to enforce. That would allow most of the
claiming problems we have described to persist until the moment of
enforcement. A doctrine of election would therefore be most effective if it
required an early election.
Early election would improve the quality of notice and reduce strategic
behavior. At the same time, designers might reasonably want to see how their
designs fare in the marketplace before deciding whether, say, trademark
protection is plausible, let alone optimal. Timing is further complicated by
the fact that design patent applications typically must be filed relatively
early, whereas copyright registration need only be sought at the point of
enforcement and trademark registrations are not necessary at all.371
In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
E.g., In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“But the mere fact that the copyright
will persist beyond the term of any design patent which may be granted does not provide a sound
basis for rejecting appellant’s design patent application.”); see Beckerman-Rodau, Problem, supra note
7, at 73 (“Most recent case law has allowed such simultaneous protection.”); Heymann, Overlapping,
supra note 7, at 252-56; McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, supra note 7, at 847 (“[N]o one seems seriously
to suggest that overlap between trademark and copyright law generally disqualifies copyrightable
works from trademark protection.”); Samuelson, Strategies, supra note 7, at 1529. Some attribute the
move to allowing multiple forms of overlapping protection to a general shift in attitude toward
favoring the interests of intellectual property creators. Beckerman-Rodau, Problem, supra note 7, at
88; Moffat, Mutant Copyrights, supra note 7, at 1496-97. One of us has advocated a return to the doctrine
of election at the product level. Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 873, 890-94 (2009) [hereinafter McKenna, Alternate Approach].
370 Again, this assumes that each internal claiming regime is fixed to improve notice and
remove possibilities for undesirable strategic behavior.
371 Supra Part I.
368
369
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Moreover, trademark rights will not even attach to designs until there has
been use in the marketplace and distinctiveness established.372 Given these
timing rules, designers would have to elect design patent protection
relatively early or effectively elect against design patent. Given the
uncertainty about whether, and when, secondary meaning might attach and
the relatively more robust functionality exclusion in trademark law, that
might create incentives for parties to choose copyright or design patent
protection more often. As between those, copyright has the cost advantage
(attaching at the moment of fixation and allowing registration to be
deferred),373 but even after Star Athletica (and perhaps especially after Star
Athletica), copyright protection for useful articles is uncertain. A doctrine of
election could therefore have the effect of pushing more design to design
patent, at least on the margin.
If we assume that the incentives are not so strong as to effectively
eliminate real choice, then there are both costs and benefits to allowing a
designer to choose the form of protection for his or her design. As one of us
has written, giving designers this choice has the benefit of recognizing that
the designer “is in the best position to know where competitors are likely to
find value.”374 That is, the designer is in a better position than anyone else—
perhaps including lawmakers—to decide whether, say, design patent’s shorter
term but perhaps broader protections are desirable over copyright’s longer
term but perhaps narrower protections, given the designer’s business strategy.
That said, although the designer might be well-placed to optimize private
benefits from protection, the designer’s choice might be a suboptimal form of
protection from society’s point of view. If designers frequently choose forms
of protection that are subpar for society, channeling doctrines might be a
better solution than a doctrine of election.375
There is one final complication to using a doctrine of election, and that
has to do with its workability. To make a doctrine of election useful, courts
(or, potentially, Congress) would need to determine which designs are subject
to election. In our view, election should apply only to designs that fall within
the subject matter of more than one of the three design protection regimes.
Those are the designs for which overlapping protection is at issue.

Supra Section I.B.
A law requiring copyright registration—whether on the early side or otherwise—would run
afoul of the Berne Convention’s prohibition on formalities as prerequisite to copyright protection.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221. Legal provision of incentives to engage in formalities, however, are permissible.
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing, supra note 184, at 494-99.
374 McKenna, Alternate Approach, supra note 369, at 892.
375 Infra subsection IV.A.2.
372
373
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One challenge to identifying the relevant designs will be the imperfect
mapping of claims in different formats, as in the Apple v. Samsung case
discussed above.376 Courts in cases involving multiple claims will have to
determine whether those claims really are to the same design. That
determination is likely to be more difficult in a world of election because
parties will have a greater incentive to vary the claims slightly in order to
mask the extent of overlap. Even if that challenge is manageable within an
individual case, the dynamic considerations are exponentially harder.
Specifically, how will a court determine which designs are subject to election
when the issue is not simply whether a party must elect a form of protection
within a particular case, but whether that party asserting rights today
regarding an ostensibly new design is really claiming a design for which
different rights were previously elected in another context?
Relatedly, a doctrine of election must specify how much of a design must
be elected. That is, must a designer choose only one form of protection for
the entire design? Or might the designer elect for, say, design patent
protection for certain design elements but trade dress for others? We think
that the doctrine of election should operate at the level of the design, or
product, rather than piecemeal on design elements.377 Allowing a party to use
different forms of protection for different elements of the same design would
enable designers to game the doctrine of election and undermine its
ameliorating effects. At the same time, a doctrine of election operating at the
design level could sometimes raise difficult questions as to what constitutes
the “design”—precisely the issue courts are now struggling with in the context
of design patent remedies.378
2. Channeling
The intellectual property system could rely on channeling doctrines rather
than a doctrine of election to eliminate overlapping protection for design,
thereby reducing concerns about different claiming methodologies.
Channeling doctrines are rules that “channel” particular subject matter to the
particular intellectual property system intended for it, and intellectual
property laws contain many such doctrines already.379 For example, copyright
Supra Section III.B.
See McKenna, Alternate Approach, supra note 369, at 891 (proposing a doctrine of election
between utility patent and trademark laws that “would force a firm to elect between forms of protection
at the product level”).
378 For a discussion of how to identify the relevant article of manufacture, and thereby to
determine the proper unit of a design, see Burstein, “Article of Manufacture” Today, supra note 32, 812-31.
379 For more on how existing doctrines channel works between utility patent and copyright, utility
patent and trademark, utility patent and design patent, and copyright and trademark, see generally
Buccafusco & Lemley, Functionality, supra note 2; see also Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright
376
377
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law’s useful articles doctrine channels out of copyright law and to utility or
design patent law, if anywhere, certain aspects of a useful article. Pursuant to
this doctrine, copyright law excludes from protection the “utilitarian aspects
of [a useful] article” and “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can[not]
be identified separately from [or are not] capable of existing independently
of ” those utilitarian aspects.380 Trademark law’s functionality doctrine
channels to utility patent law protection of features that are “essential to the
use or purpose” or “affect[] the cost or quality” of an article.381 In the design
context, channeling doctrines would direct certain designs solely to design
patent, others solely to copyright, and still others solely to trademark.
A channeling doctrine for designs would be an alternative to a doctrine of
election, with the similar effect of forbidding overlapping protection for
designs. The biggest difference is that designers would not choose which form
of protection they’d prefer; instead, courts or lawmakers would set the rules
that would determine which designs would be considered the subject matter
of design patent, trademark, or copyright. That means we would not be
leveraging designers’ experience and knowledge to identify, at the retail level,
the best form of protection. On the other hand, channeling doctrines would
also prevent designers from choosing a form of protection that provides
private benefits but social costs. Instead, these channeling doctrines would
consider at the wholesale level which design protection regimes are socially
optimal for particular types of design—which is not to say that those regimes
would always afford protection in individual cases.
Channeling doctrines also have the benefit of operating on designs from
the moment they become protectable, meaning that there would always be at
most one form of protection for a design. Unlike a doctrine of election, it
would therefore be irrelevant that a designer need not claim rights in a design
until enforcement. Third parties could consult the laws’ channeling doctrines
to determine which regime the design lies within, whether or not the designer
has yet asserted rights under that regime. This choice has benefits for
designers too because their decisions about whether to pursue design patent
protection at the outset are simplified: the designers need not weigh the
uncertain costs and benefits of electing design patent because the channeling
rules will dictate which regime is available.

Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55 (2007); McKenna & Strandburg, Progress, supra note 6; Mark P. McKenna
& Lucas Osborn, Trademarks and Digital Goods, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1425 (2017).
380 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). See generally Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion’s Function, supra note 31;
Buccafusco & Lemley, Functionality, supra note 2; supra Section I.C.
381 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (citing Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). See generally McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, supra note 6.
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Just as with a doctrine of election, channeling should happen at the level
of the design rather than for particular design elements.382 Although this
decision would also raise difficult questions about what features constitute a
“design,” we think it is preferable to piecemeal protection under different
regimes for different design elements.
In all, instituting either a doctrine of election or channeling doctrines for
design would, in addition to addressing the concerns of those disturbed by the
extent of overlapping protection for design,383 resolve the concerns about
overlapping and different claiming methodologies. That said, for those who are
comfortable with overlapping protections for design, introducing a doctrine of
election or channeling doctrine for design might seem to be too drastic a measure
to cure the claiming problems afflicting design protection. For that group, we
propose implementing a transsubstantive claiming regime, to which we now turn.
B. Transsubstantive Claiming
Transsubstantive law—a layer of law that applies across different areas of
substantive law—tends to be most familiar in the contexts of remedies384 and
civil and criminal procedure.385 It has, in the main, not been a feature of
intellectual property law.386 For claiming specifically, there might be good
reasons for the differences in methodology across regimes, reasons that
relate to the purposes of those regimes. As the extent of overlapping
protection increases, however, the variations in claiming methodology
become costlier because multiple rights, each with different claiming
Supra text accompanying note 377.
See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law Hybridization, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 65, 70
(2016) (suggesting that patent law should factor in effects on creative activities and copyright should
consider technological innovation, including by using obviousness or novelty tests to decide what
counts as fair use); McKenna, Alternate Approach, supra note 369, at 875, 894-96 (calling for
policymakers to factor in the interplay between different intellectual property protections when
shaping the scope and duration of the protection offered by each).
384 Perhaps not surprisingly, some have focused on remedies as a solution to the overlap
problem. See, e.g., Heymann, Overlapping, supra note 7, at 241-42 (suggesting that courts allow
multiple forms of protection but limit the remedies to those necessary to address the specific harms
of the specific use at issue). We are skeptical that transsubstantive remedies would resolve the
claiming concerns discussed here because they would not fix claiming upfront, although they could
help limit the collateral damage by minimizing strategic behavior of rightsholders seeking to
maximize remedies across design protection regimes.
385 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, for example, offers the ability to bring a class action for
any violation of federal law so long as certain prerequisites are met. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. But see J.
Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1625, 1627
(2017) (positing that the only way to understand the Supreme Court’s recent Rule 23 jurisprudence
is to “look past the procedural veneer and consider the underlying substantive rules and remedial
regimes at stake”).
386 But cf. Beckerman-Rodau, Problem, supra note 7, at 89 (arguing for increased collaboration
between, or even the unification of, the agencies that administer each branch of intellectual property law).
382
383

2018]

Claiming Design

209

methodologies, are more frequently asserted for the same design. A
transsubstantive claiming regime would alleviate the problems with these
multiple claiming methodologies, and it would do so in a more targeted
fashion than a doctrine of election or channeling doctrine.387
A complete description of a transsubstantive claiming regime is beyond the
scope of this Article. But one goal of such a system should be to improve claim
stability over time, both within a case and across cases. It is true that one area
of design protection—trademark law—emphasizes consumer understanding,
and for that reason, it recognizes that rights might change over time. But
whatever the merits of that approach generally, we have seen the mischief it can
cause in the context of design. Thus, at the very least, a claimant should bear
the burden of establishing that there is a good reason, such as an
overwhelmingly changed consumer understanding, to accept an evolving claim.
One way to operationalize that burden shifting would be to deny a
presumption of validity with regard to rights that are inconsistent with
those previously claimed—perhaps in the context of registration—and to
extend the presumption only to design as originally claimed. A slightly
stronger version would be to apply estoppel principles across time, so that
a party that claimed one way in one case would be barred from claiming the
design differently in other cases.
In terms of format, we tentatively propose a system with both visual and
verbal claims. Courts in all areas of design protection have concerns about
verbal claiming because it can result in losing sight of the overall design. At
the same time, visual claims often cannot be interpreted without verbal
description of particular features, especially in the common circumstance in
which some (perhaps many) of the features are not protectable standing
alone. The optimal claiming methodology would draw the best from both
modes of claiming to account for the concerns about those modes. More
specifically, we think in many cases claims will be most intelligible when they
visually depict the claimed features and then verbally describe which aspects
are not claimed. Focusing on the features not claimed will help avoid verbal
overshadowing while addressing the central concern about visual claiming,
namely that unprotectable features will be weighted inappropriately in
assessing validity, infringement, or both.
387 In this regard, a consideration of the virtues and vices of transsubstantive claiming for
design replicates debates that occur about transsubstantive law in other areas, like civil procedure:
the practicality and ease of a “one size fits all” law versus a multiplicity of laws that are finely and
appropriately attuned to their respective contexts. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery
Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237
(1989); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114
HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay
on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377 (2010).
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CONCLUSION
At the outset, we noted how striking good design can be. While we hope
it continues to be so, we think design protection regimes should become less
striking by undoing the mischief they cause through their widely varying
claiming methodologies. This multiplicity of claiming regimes undermines the
quality of notice that design claims provide third parties about claim scope.
These notice problems are ironic because intellectual property claims exist
almost entirely to provide notice. Claim ambiguity and a party’s ability to
switch back and forth between different design claims—both within and across
legal regimes—make it difficult for courts or third parties to evaluate the
validity and scope of rights. Cumulation also enables design rightsholders to
assert rights in one or more regimes using the claiming rules that benefit them
most at a particular moment, without any material consequences to claiming
the design differently at a later time. We think that any of our proposed
solutions—a doctrine of election, channeling doctrine, and a transsubstantive
claiming methodology—would ameliorate these concerns, thereby enabling
third parties to better assess their freedom to operate and create other designs.
Design protection regimes ought to be improved to encourage the creation of
good designs, without also causing confusion about claim scope.

